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From the Editor 
When you think about it, many of us have jobs for a very simple reason: because the 
world changes.  If governments were certain of the future, they would not need as many 
of us to “hold down the fort” during chaotic times.  If the world weren’t in a constant 
state of change, we might not need to learn or teach nearly as much as we do; we 
wouldn’t have to think critically and independently, nor need to be taught how.  A static, 
unchanging Earth would be a boring place. 
A bittersweet change for CTX – this is the last time I will be writing the Letter from 
the Editor: I’m moving on to the United States Department of State as a Foreign Service 
Junior Officer, after a grueling 13-month application process.  By the time you read this, I 
should be starting my training, in a world as uncertain to me now as the global one is to 
all of us. 
And that, in many respects, is the theme of this issue: uncertainty.  As we hail 2012, 
think of how much remains uncertain.  Some of the articles in this issue raise questions 
about morality in a modern bureaucratic world; the unknowable consequences of letting 
an infamous jihadist die in an American prison; and how we measure success against 
terrorists. 
Once again, we invite your comments on any and all of the pieces in this issue and 
hope that they provoke thought – and discussion – keeping our minds flexible for dealing 
with the uncertain times ahead of us. 
It has been a monumental pleasure and learning experience working with CTFP, 
helping to stand up CTX, and getting to know those fellows I’ve been able to meet.  I 
hope that collectively we continue to make the best, and not the worst, of uncertainty. 
A note from the Executive Editors: we wish nothing but the best to Julia and look forward 
to visiting her abroad, particularly when she’s Ambassador McClennon, which we hope 
she is one day.  It is in large part thanks to her considerable efforts, along with those of 
Amelia Simunek, that CTX was stood up in such short order.  Julia is going to be 
impossible to duplicate and very hard to replace. 
The Editors at CTX 
CTXEditor@gmail.com  
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Content Recon… a sneak peek 
This issue opens with former SEAL and Editorial Board member Paul Shemella’s “Measuring a Government’s 
Capacity to Fight Terrorism.”  Shemella offers us a framework that can, and arguably should, be modified according to 
the local context since, as he points out, “fighting terrorism is all about context.” 
Take Brazil.  That’s the topic of retired Brazilian Army Major General and former Special Forces Commander 
Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro’s article about how Brazil organizes security for major events.  While “The Fifth CISM 
Military World Games” does, as the title suggest, concentrate on last July’s Military World Games, this is hardly the 
only large event Brazil has hosted or will host in the near future.  Olympics, anyone? 
Or, consider Egypt – which is what Irakli Mchedlishvili does in her contribution, “Radicalization in Light of the 
Developments in Egypt.”  Mcedlishvili argues for greater international cooperation with civil society groups, and 
knows whereof she speaks as a member of just such a Georgia-based civil society group herself. 
Or, consider Uganda – and the kind of terrorism that now confronts it.  That’s the subject of Ugandan People’s 
Defence Forces Marine major, David Munyua’s article. 
Or, how about the question SUNY professor Brian Nussbaum poses in “The Forgotten Jihadist.”   What is likely 
to happen when religious leader Abdel-Rahman dies in a U.S. prison facility which, given his poor health, is bound to 
occur at some point in the near future? 
As for our regular features, we introduce “The Written Word” – book reviews.  In this issue, Dr. Dona J. Stewart 
takes a look at Robin Wright’s Rock the Casba,h and Dr. James J. F. Forest reviews Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker’s 
Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America’s Secret Campaign Against al-Qaeda. 
NPS student and Norwegian Army Major Lars Lilleby was actually able to sit down with Eric Schmitt recently in 
Monterey. Ideally, the resulting interview will plant the bug in readers’ minds. If you have an interesting visitor, 
PLEASE consider doing an interview for CTX. 
In “The Moving Image” Dr. Kalev I. Sepp offers up a “Top Ten” list – just begging for responses. 
In “Ethics and Insights” George Lober stirs the pot regarding moral courage with the express aim of inviting 
comments and responses. 
And in the “Resources” section, you’ll find news about publications by CTFP fellows and faculty. 
Everything in this issue, as in the preceding two, is designed to prime the pump and get your juices flowing: we 
always want your feedback on what is written. But we also are always looking for contributions from you: more film 
reviews, book reviews, interviews, articles – and FIRST PERSON ACCOUNTS, always! 
 
 
How to Subscribe 
Anyone can subscribe to CTX free of charge by 
emailing CTXSubscribe@gmail.com with the word 
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Without capacity, good strategy 
cannot be formulated or executed; 
without good strategy, capacity 
is largely wasted. 
Measuring a Government’s 
Capacity to Fight Terrorism  
by Paul Shemella 
Along the path to any strategic end, leaders are obliged to ask whether that path is leading them to the outcome 
they seek.  The answer to this question may not always be clear.  Measuring the effectiveness of any strategy is difficult.  
As reflected in the growing body of literature on measurement, the challenge is not measuring effort but results.1  
Measuring effectiveness, especially in fighting terrorism, can only be based on how we evaluate the results of our 
efforts, particularly at the political level.  The selection, evaluation, and integration of ‘measures of effectiveness,’ or 
MOE, has become a vital component of strategy development and execution. 
But what if we wanted to measure a government’s overall 
capacity to fight terrorism?  We would have to look one level higher 
than strategy; we would have to examine a government’s structures 
and processes for developing strategy in the first place.   Without 
capacity, good strategy cannot be formulated or executed; without 
good strategy, capacity is largely wasted.  And what if a government 
has succeeded in preventing terrorist attacks altogether?  Could its 
leaders claim they have done everything right, or have they just been lucky?  There must be a way to measure readiness 
for a terrorist event that has not yet happened, especially when the worst-case scenario is so severe.  Governments 
must find a methodology that relies on judgment, not merely on numbers.  Such a methodology would give leaders 
confidence that their policies are minimizing the probability their citizens will be attacked - whether or not terrorist 
attacks have actually taken place.   
Capacity to minimize the odds of terrorist attacks taking place at all cannot be separated from capacity to 
minimize the damage from terrorist attacks that have already occurred.  In other words, governments need a system to 
evaluate their performance in a variety of functions related to terrorism.  This article proposes evaluating a 
government’s capacity to execute a spectrum of four basic functions:  Strategy, Institutional Preparation, Intelligence, 
and Emergency Management.  The premise here is that if a government can do all these things well, its citizens can feel 
relatively safe – and its leaders can claim they have done the best they can against a very difficult threat.  But how do 
they turn their best judgment into numbers that can be analyzed? 
                                                          
1
 David Kilcullen has done the best work on measuring effectiveness for irregular conflict.  See his unpublished essay ‘Measuring 
Progress in Afghanistan,’ December 2009, found on the web.  See also Paul Shemella, et al, Fighting Back: What Governments Can 
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Indirect Measurement 
Even when the result of an intangible like prevention cannot be measured 
directly, the processes and systems that lead to the desired outcome can 
be.2  The place to begin is by identifying ‘desired outcomes,’ perhaps 
stated as “what are the significant achievements we would like to be able 
to report to our citizens?”  We can then list a set of preconditions that 
must be in place in order to achieve the desired outcomes. Take the example of a hypothetical country with the usual 
set of root causes for terrorism.  Ameliorating root causes will certainly reduce the likelihood of terrorist attacks.  One 
desired outcome might be stated as follows:  
“We have eliminated the root causes of terrorism in the country.”  
This statement cannot be substantiated with raw numbers, but there is a process for converting the 
government’s broad approaches into numbers that can be evaluated.  This is indirect measurement, or what could be 
called ‘institutionalizing measures of effort.’  A vital interim step in such a process is the identification of ‘preconditions’ 
that we think will enable us to reach the desired outcome. In this case, the list of preconditions could include the 
following hopeful statements: 
1. “There is a process for inter-ethnic dialogue throughout the country.” 
2. “We have strengthened the justice system.” 
3. “We have eliminated corruption from law enforcement institutions.” 
4. “We guarantee universal access to basic health care.” 
5. “We have ensured that every citizen can receive a basic level of education.” 
6. “There is a system for reviewing complaints against the government.” 
7. “There is a lively, open, and responsible press establishment.” 
8. “The armed forces provide support to civilian law enforcement authorities but do  
not themselves enforce the law.” 
For the purposes of this example, we can assume that these statements have been formulated over time by a panel 
of experts in our hypothetical government. The preconditions for getting to our desired outcome can now be evaluated 
on a scale of 0-5 by another (independent) panel of experts.3  The experts will assign a “0” to statements for which 
nothing has been done, a “5” to statements where everything has been done, or interim values to reflect partial 
accomplishment. At the end of this process, the numbers can be aggregated to determine the ratio of the actual score to 
the maximum possible (“best”) score. For eight preconditions, the maximum score is 40. If the actual total comes to 20, 
                                                          
2
 Glenn Woodbury, “Measuring Prevention,” Homeland Security Affairs 1, no. 1 (Summer 2005). 
 
…how do they turn their  
best judgment into numbers  
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Democracies have a wider variety  
of tools than authoritarian forms of 
government, one reason they  
tend to be more successful  
in the long run. 
it can be said that the government has made progress but probably not enough. This ratio is not very useful by itself, but 
when compared to other desired outcomes, it may show where the government needs to invest resources, as well as 
where its previous investments have paid off.  
What is more, if the experts score each statement individually rather than by consensus, it will be possible to 
find an aggregate score for each individual precondition.  This can give a more detailed picture of where the most 
improvement is needed, and how it can be achieved. For instance, weighing the judgment of ten experts means that 50 
is the best possible score for each precondition. “We have 
strengthened the justice system” might get an aggregate score of 
20, while “We have eliminated corruption from law enforcement 
institutions” might score 43. It may then be argued that some 
methods for bringing police corruption under control might be 
adapted to strengthening the justice system. In a logical and 
methodical way, we can transform judgment into numbers, and 
then compare those numbers to one another for a more thorough 
analysis.  
Reaching into the Toolkit 
Every government has an array of tools it can use to develop and execute strategies for all aspects of fighting terrorism.  
Democracies have a wider variety of tools than authoritarian forms of government, one reason they tend to be more 
successful in the long run.4  The list of tools, or ‘instruments of national power’ as they are sometimes called, might 
include the following: 
Diplomacy     Intelligence 
Information     Law Enforcement 
Military      Emergency Response5 
Economic     Civil Society6 
Financial     Moral Factors7 
                                                          
4
 But democracies are more vulnerable to political violence in the short run, prompting government officials to balance liberty with 
security. 
5
 The proficiency to manage the consequences of terrorist attacks that cannot be prevented is now just as much an instrument of 
national power as any of the traditional “DIMEFIL” tools. Known resilience of critical infrastructure, for instance, can deter terrorist 
attack. 
6
 Citizens, acting together, can be the most potent tool a society has to address the problem of terrorism. 
7
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How can we measure how well 
a government provides 
institutional capacity? 
Governments express these instruments of power through institutions, and it is institutional capacity on which 
our focus will fall.  Individuals cannot produce policies, strategies, and operational plans on their own.  They must act 
together in various teams, each with a clearly defined role, promulgated by political authorities.  The fulfillment of these 
roles should drive funding levels, equipment procurement, and most of all personnel requirements.  Smart and 
motivated individuals are assigned to institutions, improve them as much as they can while there, and then move on to 
other institutions or the private sector - but it is institutions that produce national security over time.  
Institutional roles, however, must be complementary; no one institution can, or should, do everything.  Sound 
national security decision-making relies on the specialization and diversity of views that a balanced set of institutions 
provides.  If one institution goes beyond its mandated role, seeking roles and resources that should go to other 
institutions, that balance is altered in surprisingly complex ways.  Greedy institutions, like greedy individuals, are bad for 
collective effort.  Ministers, directors, and secretaries everywhere must remember that the only institution that really 
matters is the government that each of them serves. 
Institutions act as crucibles for the development of capability and capacity.  Without strong and clean 
institutions, no strategy can be executed and no success against terrorism ever achieved.  But capability is not the same 
as capacity.  Capability can be demonstrated once or twice (especially to superiors) but will not by itself produce 
measurable results.  Capacity, however, requires enough resources to 
execute essential capabilities day after day, year after year. 8  When 
we talk about the role of institutions in fighting terrorism, we are 
really talking about institutional capacity.  How can we measure how 
well a government does that? 
Measuring Capacity 
The indirect measurement technique already described can be used to measure a government’s institutional capacity to 
fight terrorism.  This methodology is essentially a framework for self-assessment.  The framework assesses capacity in 
                                                          
8
 Competence is another term often equated with capability.  Normally obtained through training, competence describes the ability 
to produce a measureable result.  It is useful to think of building capacity as an orchestrated sequence of creating competence, 
capability, and capacity. 
…no one institution can, or should, do everything.  
Sound national security decision-making relies on the specialization  
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four functional areas: Strategy, Institutional Preparation, Intelligence, and Emergency Management.9  In order to explain 
the methodology, let us take a sample from the “strategy” functional area: 
Strategy. We can list six “desired outcomes” for the strategy function. 
1. Appropriate government institutions have clear roles in combating terrorism. 
2. There is a process for coordinating strategy development among government institutions. 
3. There is a process for developing an accurate and comprehensive strategic analysis. 
4. There is a legal framework for developing responses to terrorism. 
5. There is a method for measuring the effectiveness of strategies to combat terrorism. 
6. There is a political-level strategy for combating terrorism.10 
For each desired outcome above, we can list a set of preconditions that will lead a government to that outcome. 
To use just one example, the preconditions for desired outcome #1 should read something like this: 
A.  The Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and intelligence 
agencies have written guidance on their responsibilities for combating terrorism. 
B.  Other ministries have written guidance consistent with the government’s legal definition of 
terrorism. 
C.  Institutional roles are not in conflict with each other. 
D.  There are no gaps between institutions in terms of responsibility for combating terrorism.  
Applying the Likert Scale, we can assign a number to each precondition, based on the judgment of five experts, 
selected for the strategy assessment. Those experts can be officials from the government being assessed, terrorism 
specialists from the private sector, or they can even be from another government with more experience in fighting 
terrorism. A hypothetical set of values assigned by them might look something like this: 
A. 2 out of 5 
B. 4 out of 5 
C. 2 out of 5 
D. 2 out of 5. 
The total number 10 (out of a possible 20) does not tell us much by itself. The aggregation of totals for each of 
the six desired outcomes (and their associated preconditions) would give us a total for the strategy function (as well as a 
                                                          
9
 The framework for assessing CT capacity was developed by a team from ‘The Center for Civil-Military Relations’ (CCMR) consisting 
of Paul Shemella, Lawrence E. Cline, Edward E. Hoffer, James Petroni, and Matthew King.  CCMR is an arm of the Naval Postgraduate 
School in Monterey, California. 
10
 Operational-level strategies, which would include the security services, are listed as a desired outcome in the ‘Institutional 
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Fighting terrorism can succeed  
only when a spectrum of 
institutions, each with clear roles,  
work together in a  
systematic way. 
comprehensive comparison within the field of preconditions).11 The final number for “strategy” can then be compared 
to total values from the other three functional areas to indicate relative institutional capacity – and where the most 
resources should be invested in the future.   All Desired Outcomes for the Strategy functional area are listed, with 
suggested preconditions, can be found in Figure 1 at http://www.ccmr.org/public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/5701 . 
Institutional Preparation. The second functional area to be examined is “institutional preparation.” The desired 
outcomes and preconditions for this category are broken into four pieces: operational-level strategies, operational 
plans, manpower development programs, and infrastructure support. The desired outcomes can be stated as follows. 
1. Each government institution with a CT role has a current and coordinated operational-level  
strategy that incorporates measures of effectiveness. 
2. Each CT institution has a current and coordinated set of operational-level plans. 
3. Each CT institution has a comprehensive manpower development program. 
4. Each CT institution has adequate infrastructure to support its expected missions, or it has 
 identified shortfalls. 
What do we mean by a “CT Institution?”  Any government organization with specific responsibility for 
preventing or dealing with terrorism should be included under this rubric.  That means almost all institutions in nearly all 
governments.  Fighting terrorism can only succeed when a spectrum of institutions, each with clear roles, work together 
in a systematic way (see the “strategy” module above). Desired outcomes and preconditions for the “institutional 
preparation” module can be found in Figure 2 at http://www.ccmr.org/public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/5701. 
Intelligence. The third functional area is “intelligence.”  There is 
nothing more important in the crafting of strategy, or in the 
execution of operations, than having timely and accurate 
intelligence.  The process for ensuring that intelligence is accurate 
requires extensive coordination among government institutions, 
and perhaps multiple intelligence agencies. If undertaken seriously, 
this process can serve as an example of how the rest of the 
government reaches workable interagency decisions.   Desired 
outcomes and preconditions for the “intelligence” module can be 
found in Figure 3 at http://www.ccmr.org/public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/5701. 
                                                          
11
 The Strategy functional area in this methodology refers to the political level.  Without a political-level strategy, individual 
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The long-term effort to eliminate  
the root causes of Terrorism is most 
often a strategy for better 
governance. That is the principal 
goal of any government and the  
fervent wish of all citizens. 
What has been introduced here is a method, not a recipe  
Emergency Management. The capacity for a government to recover from the effects of a terrorist attack can act as a 
deterrent to further attacks.  A government cannot be evaluated as completely prepared for the threat of terrorism 
unless it has a deep capacity for emergency management (sometimes called ‘consequence management’).  Fortunately 
for under-resourced governments, the same institutions and processes used for responding to natural disasters can be 
drawn upon in the aftermath of a terrorist attack.  All-hazards approaches to risk assessment can lead directly to 
responsible dual usage.  Desired outcomes and preconditions for the “Emergency Management” module can be found in 
Figure 4 at http://www.ccmr.org/public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/5701. 
Totals for desired outcomes and preconditions in all four functional areas can be aggregated as shown in Figure 
5 (that can be found at http://www.ccmr.org/public/library_file_proxy.cfm/lid/5701) and analyzed in comparison to one 
another.  Numbers, drawn from judgment, can tell us quite a lot about where a government has been doing well and 
where it has not. 
Back to Root Causes  
The long-term effort to eliminate the root causes of terrorism has been listed as a precondition for achieving a 
comprehensive political-level strategy.12  It may well be that a government wishes to separate this function from the 
four we have listed, building a fifth functional area on which to apply the indirect measurement technique (indeed, this 
article has identified preconditions that could be used as a starting point).  For countries with a surfeit of root causes, 
this might make perfect sense, yielding greater resolution of the problem.  Certainly, the government of New Zealand 
would approach this challenge differently than the governments 
of India or Israel.  Root causes operate across the full spectrum of 
a society.  Identifying and mitigating them will reduce the 
probability that extremist elements in that society will gain the 
support they need for a sustained terrorism campaign.  The long-
term effort to eliminate the root causes of terrorism is most often 
a strategy for better governance.  That is the principal goal of any 
government and the fervent wish of all citizens.13  
                                                          
12 There are really three basic strategies for any government to employ against terrorism.  The first of these should be targeted at 
root causes; the others focus on offensive and defense measures.   
13
 Terrorism is a transnational event that can threaten even the best-governed societies, but good governance – and the trust 
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Certain concepts and principles are 
universal, but … individual 
governments must modify the 
framework to suit their own 
historical, economic, cultural, 
and political conditions. 
All Governance Is Local 
What has been introduced here is a method, not a recipe.  It could 
be called ‘Wikipedia’ for self-assessment.  Every government needs a 
way to measure its capacity to fight terrorism successfully; and each 
one could modify the framework according to what makes sense 
within its own local context.  Fighting terrorism is all about context.  
Certain concepts and principles are universal, but their application 
can be quite different from society to society.  The framework 
described here should fall within the universal sphere, but individual 
governments must modify the framework to suit their own historical, economic, cultural, and political conditions.   
Properly used, it allows government officials to identify their own ‘capacity gaps’ and develop a plan to fill them.  
Capacity gaps are the raw material for further analysis and concrete actions.  But how are they made to benefit 
the policeman on the street, the medic in the ambulance, or the solider in the field?  Government officials must take the 
capacity gaps they find at the national level and send scarce resources where they are needed most - to those in the 
field who actually fight terrorism and its effects on society.  They must also require leaders all the way down to develop 
and coordinate operational plans, as well as the supporting tasks needed to confront terrorists where they work.  A 
government that does this can be said to be governing well.  In the final analysis, a path toward good governance is the 
key to fighting terrorism successfully.  Measuring capacity is the essential first step on that path.  
 
Paul Shemella is a retired Navy Captain who served as a SEAL officer until 1997.  He joined The Center for Civil-Military 
Relations (CCMR) in 1998.  Through a network of theoreticians and practitioners, he manages 'Combating Terrorism' 
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…events are held every four years 
as part of CISM’s efforts to 
 fulfill its motto: 
“Friendship Through Sport.” 
Brazil prepared for more than two years to provide security for the Military Games, 
which have grown to be the third-largest sporting event of the world… 
The Fifth CISM Military  
World Games: A Security Challenge for a  
Huge International Event  
by Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro 
The success of the fifth Conseil Internationale du Sport Militaire (CISM) Military World Games, conducted in July 
2011 in several cities of Rio de Janeiro State, demonstrated Brazil’s ability to provide security for a massive sporting 
event. The 2011 Games involved 6,000 athletes from 114 countries who are members of the military; these events are 
held every four years as part of CISM’s efforts to fulfill its motto: 
“Friendship Through Sport.” 
Brazil prepared for more than two years to provide security for 
the Military World Games, which have grown to be the third-largest 
sporting event of the world, following only the Olympic Games and the 
Soccer World Cup. The outcome was a solid demonstration of Brazil’s 
sporting and security competence, particularly within its armed forces. 
(The Brazilian athletic delegation to the Games also turned in an outstanding performance, earning first place, with 114 
medals: 45 gold, 33 silver and 36 bronze). 
The Brazilian Army Eastern Military Command (CML/EB) was put in charge of the Games’ security through a 
presidential directive transmitted by the Minister of Defense. The Commandant of the 1st Army Division was designated 
as the Security Executive Coordinator (CES), and he established an Operations Coordination Center involving personnel, 
intelligence, operations, logistics, and social communication cells. Furthermore, a justice advisory team was established. 
The division commander’s maneuver elements were two infantry brigades—the Parachute Infantry Brigade and the 9th 
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…these teams were stealthily dispersed 
 at strategic points in Rio de Janeiro State,  
ready around the clock  
to be deployed to specific objectives in both  
proactive and reactive situations. 
For preventing and combating 
terrorism, the CES was given operational 
control of a Joint Special Operations Task Force 
(JSOTF) established by the Commander of the 
Brazilian Army Special Operations Brigade. The 
JSOTF included the following elements from 
the Brazilian Army Special Operations Brigade: 
the Counterterrorism Detachment from the 1st 
Special Forces Battalion, the 1st Commandos 
Actions Company from the 1st Commandos 
Actions Battalion, elements from the Special 
Operations Support Battalion, and the 1st 
Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Platoon. In 
addition, maneuver, attack, and 
reconnaissance helicopters from all the 
institutions involved were present and ready, 
with crews trained for special air operations. 
The Brazilian Navy supplied elements of the 
Rescue and Recovery Special Group from the 
Combat Divers Group; also included in the 
security effort were elements of the Rescue 
and Recovery Special Group from the Marines 
Special Operations Battalion. 
From the Department of Federal Police 
came elements of the Tactical Operations 
Command, and resources from the Special 
Police Operations Battalion of the State of Rio 
de Janeiro Military Police also joined in 
providing security. The Civilian Police of the 
State of Rio de Janeiro provided SWAT teams 
from its Special Resources Coordination. 
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In general, there is no empathy with 
law enforcement agencies (LEA), but 
the Army is accepted.  
It is critical to identify and meet 
community leaders. 
Under the leadership of the Brazilian Army Special 
Operations Brigade, the JSOTF developed tactical exercises on the 
ground for both assault tactical teams and sniper teams. During the 
Games, these teams were stealthily dispersed at strategic points in 
Rio de Janeiro State, ready around the clock to be deployed to 
specific objectives in both proactive and reactive situations. 
The Military World Games were a great test of the Brazilian 
security structure’s operational capability. Like other recent events, including the South American/Arab Countries 
Conference Summit (2005), the Special Operations Brigade’s field tactical exercise Black October 2010, and the visits of 
Pope Benedict XVI in 2010 and of U.S. President Barack Obama in 2011, the World Games provided many useful lessons. 
 
Lessons Learned14 
The lessons learned from the security operation surrounding the Military Games, and from several other operations on 
the streets and favelas (slums) of large Brazilian cities, can be useful for any country considering military operations 
against irregular forces in urban terrain. Some of those lessons are detailed here. 
A. In the “favelas,” the streets are extremely narrow and lack signage. Buildings are very close to each 
other, severely restricting observation and firing fields. Designating targets is a hard task. In general, 
the topography is extremely irregular, and combatants in higher places gain an overwhelming 
advantage. 
 
B. Commanders at all levels must understand the human dimension of the population in the area. Most 
residents are good citizens who do not have links to drug trafficking and work outside the operational 
area, using various transportation means such as motorcycles and vans. Because they fear retaliatory 
actions from the gang members after the Army leaves the area, residents usually hesitate to provide 
information. In general, there is no empathy with the law enforcement agencies (LEA), but the Army 
is accepted. It is critical to identify and meet community leaders. 
 
C. The Army should not identify drug trafficking gangs as the enemy; it should want to avoid the 
appearance, in the eyes of the public, that its operations are being conducted in a context of 
                                                          
14
 The information in this section has been modified from Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro, “Irregular Warfare: Brazil’s Fight against Criminal 
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Close combat to clear buildings 
and houses is the norm.  
Sniper activity is intense,  
so passive and active  
measures must be established 
to counter snipers. 
Less ELINT and SIGINT and more HUMINT is the rule.  
Counterintelligence is also extremely relevant. Each soldier must be a sensor. 
conventional warfare. Therefore, gangs are better identified as opposition forces or  
“forças adversas.” 
 
D. The opposition forces have great power to intimidate the local population with their fire- power, 
which includes automatic rifles, submachine guns, pistols, and hand grenades. They often employ 
children to deliver drugs and to get information about troop movements; use caches to hide 
weapons and ammunition; and communicate with cell phones, small radios, fireworks, and visual 
signs. When gang members find themselves at a disadvantage, they try to blend in with the local 
population, and in critical situations they may use the 
population as a shield. More and more, these forces are 
employing urban guerrilla tactics, techniques and 
procedures. 
 
E. Actions against criminal gangs in large cities are basically 
urban operations, and success depends primarily on small 
unit effectiveness and efficiency. Often, there is 
decentralization of actions down to the squad or team 
level. This type of action requires well-trained, disciplined 
soldiers and exceptional leaders at all levels who are capable of maintaining high moral standards. 
Rifle marksmanship during the day and night (when angles and distances differ), small-unit tactics 
(particularly in close combat), and effective communications are critical issues. Urban operations 
require special weapons and ammunition (including nonlethal) and tools for breaching and entering 
buildings. Close combat to clear buildings and houses is the norm. Sniper activity is intense, so 
passive and active measures must be established to counter snipers. Machine gun drills and fire 
control are absolutely critical. Light mechanized forces are effective because of their ability to move 
quickly to isolate opposition forces, control highways and main avenues, and attack decisive points. If 
needed, they are also useful for fire support in close combat, and can have great psychological effect. 
 
F. Commanders must establish rules of engagement (ROE) and rules for the escalation of force to avoid 
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civilian noncombatants is a very difficult but vital task. Even while displaying an aggressive attitude 




G. Specific demands are made on intelligence preparation. Terrain is described in terms of lines of 
communications, the urban pattern, and building structure. Civilian concentrations and critical 
infrastructure must be studied. Intelligence data collection about the opposition forces is an essential 
task. Less ELINT and SIGINT and more HUMINT is the rule. Counterintelligence is also extremely 
relevant. Each soldier must be a sensor. The best source of information is the “bad guy” arrested 
alive, so soldiers must be trained to get timely information from captured gang members in order to 
achieve tactical advantages. However, commanders must establish limits on detention and 
interrogation. In order to keep high moral standards, torture is completely unacceptable. To ensure 
these results, high standards of leadership at all levels are essential. 
 
H. The decision-making process must establish actions to be performed in three phases: isolation, 
movement to contact, and conquest of key points. Principles of mass and unity of command must be 
observed. Law enforcement personnel under operational control must support the decision-making 
process and participate in the operations on receiving complementary tasks. Command posts must 
be established close to the operational area. In most of the favelas of Rio, the isolation phase 
demands the occupation of the railroad station used by that community, as well as the establishment 
of blocking and checkpoints in the access. Whenever possible, in order to gain a significant tactical 
advantage, stealthy occupation of dominant points must be executed in advance 
 
I. Employment of Army Aviation helicopters with crews trained in special air operations tactics is very 
important to help facilitate command and control, move small units quickly and precisely, and 
provide a good psychological effect. Often, gangs erect barricades in order to block access to key 
points; therefore, engineer support is mandatory to clear the way. 
 
J. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are needed in all phases of the operation—for training the general 
purposes forces before the deployment, operating during the deployment, and continuing to work after 
most of the deployment has been completed. Psychological Operations tactical teams are essential to 
win the “hearts and minds” of the local population. Using loudspeakers and passing out leaflets have 
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Social communication is extremely important  
to the success of a mission. 
Brazil, the best law enforcement special operations units are trained by the Army. Experience shows 
that civilian police SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) teams and military police special operations 
teams may be deployed to accomplish specific tasks under the operational control of the Army’s SOF. 
 
K. Social communication is extremely important to the success of a mission. Selected reporters should 
be afforded the opportunity to cover the operation under specific restrictions since keeping the 
media updated on the operations is indispensable. Legal aspects are fundamental, and justice backup 
is essential. All searches and arrests must be conducted in accordance with the law and performed 
legally. 
 
L. The Brazilian Army experience in Haiti has proved extremely important for better understanding 
urban operations. MINUSTAH (United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti) was activated in 2004 
under the military command of a Brazilian two-star general, and lessons learned from that operation 
are being effectively and efficiently disseminated elsewhere. The Brazilian Army’s Special Operations 
Training Center (recently transferred to the City of Niteroi, State of Rio de Janeiro), the Brazilian Joint 
Peace Operations Training Center (City of Rio de Janeiro, State of Rio de Janeiro), and the Guarantee 
of Law and Order Training Center (City of Campinas, State of São Paulo) have the responsibility of 




Operations developed to provide the security of international events like the Military World Games are routinely 
conducted by the Brazilian Armed Forces. Such operations usually are performed under directives from the President of 
the Republic transmitted by the Minister of Defense, and are normally conducted under the responsibility of the 
respective Area Military Command  of the Brazilian Army. This Army Command also usually receives operational control 





Vol. 2, No.1      CTX 
 
…the Brazilian Armed Forces, 
particularly the Army, are fully aware 
that … they must be sufficiently 
flexible and versatile enough to 
deploy capably against nontraditional 
or new security threats. 
These security tasks routinely involve the development of the “Guarantee of Law and Order” operations, an 
Armed Forces mission stated in Article 142 of the Brazilian Constitution. Mainly because of their political implications, 
the conduct of operations under the Guarantee of Law and Order is 
always viewed with suspicion by the services’ high commands. 
However, the Brazilian Armed Forces, particularly the Army, are 
fully aware that besides their traditional tasks, they must be 
sufficiently flexible and versatile enough to deploy capably against 
both guerrillas and urban drug gangs as well as against 
nontraditional or new security threats. These needs include 
operations to prevent and combat terrorism.15 
The lessons learned from all of these experiences are being 
applied to security planning under way for large, international events that will be held in Brazil in the future, including 
the Ecological Conference RIO+20 in 2012; the Youth Festival of Pope Benedict XVI and the Soccer Federations Cup in 
2013; the Soccer World Cup in 2014; and the Olympic Games in 2016. 
 
Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro is a Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret, former Special Forces Commander, and a Joint Special 
Operations University (JSOU) Associate Fellow. 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Since November 2010, the Brazilian Army’s Eastern Military Command has been in charge of a “Pacification Force” (an infantry 
brigade with two battalion task forces) deployed in the largest of Rio’s favelas, the Complexo do Alemão/Penha, with a population of 
more than 500,000 people. This arrangement is scheduled to extend through June 2012. 
 
ATTENTION: CT Professionals 
Would you like us to highlight particular activities or unique resources to the greater CT 
community?  Let us know at CTXEditor@gmail.com and it will be considered for inclusion 
in a future issue of CTX for all our readers.   
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Radicalization in Light of the 
Developments in Egypt:  
Challenges to Effective  
International Cooperation  
by Irakli Mchedlishvili 
Background 
In the decade after 9/11, many countries perceived terrorism and especially Islamic terrorism as one of the main threats 
to national and international security and stability.16 The Greater Middle East was perceived as a region where Al Qaeda 
and similar organizations had the strongest foothold.17  
Numerous factors, including Iran’s 1979 revolution and conversion into a theocratic state and the Taliban’s 
coming to power in Afghanistan in 1996, created the impression that other countries in the region without a strong ruler 
or regime could easily fall into the hands of radical Islamic forces. Consequently, the international community chose to 
look at many authoritarian regimes of the region as partners or allies in the fight against radicalization  
and terrorism.18   
                                                          
16
One example of this attitude can be seen in this quote from Christopher Bennett: “A day after hijackers flew commercial airliners 
into the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, the Allies responded by invoking Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty for the first time in the Alliance's history. And by agreeing that a terrorist attack by a non-state actor should 
trigger NATO's collective self-defence obligation, the Alliance had, in effect, mandated itself to make combating terrorism an 
enduring NATO mission.” “Interpreting Prague: Combating Terrorism,” NATO Review, Spring 2003, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue1/english/art2.html/, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011). 
 
17
 Evidence of this view can be found in many places, such as the Wikipedia entry on Al Qaeda, which includes this passage: “Others, 
however, see Al-Qaeda as an integrated network that is strongly led from the Pakistani tribal areas and has a powerful strategic 
purpose. … Al-Qaeda has the following direct franchises: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which comprises Al-Qaeda in Saudi 
Arabia; Islamic Jihad of Yemen; Al-Qaeda in Iraq; Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb; Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen in 
Somalia; Egyptian Islamic Jihad; Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.” “Al-Qaeda” in Wikipedia, (last modified Dec. 3, 2011), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Qaeda, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011). And from another article, “Former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer, who 
led the CIA's hunt for Osama Bin Laden, states that terrorist attacks—specifically Al Qaeda attacks on America—are not motivated 
by a religiously-inspired hatred of American culture or religion, but by the belief that U.S. foreign policy has oppressed, killed, or 
otherwise harmed Muslims in the Middle East.” “Islamic Terrorism,” in Wikipedia,  (last modified Nov. 30, 2011), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_terrorism, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011).   
 
18
 According to Alvise Armellini, “As it was mentioned by the Enlargement commissioner, Stefan Fule said the EU should reach out to 
'the crowds in the streets of Tunis, Cairo and elsewhere' rather than interact 'with dictators who are, as we speak, spilling the blood 
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Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt was an active member of the international community in the fight against terrorism, and 
Egypt is a major non-NATO ally to the United States.19 Egypt was a natural ally in the war against terrorism as the 
country had long been targeted by terrorist groups. Various radical organizations acting in the country include what 
experts say is Al Qaeda’s direct franchise, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and Egypt has been the target of terrorist attacks at 
least seven times since 2001.20 Due partly to these reasons, Western financial and military support of Egypt and 
particularly Mubarak’s regime was substantial. Egypt for many years received more than one billion dollars annually 
from the U.S., making it second only to Israel in the amount of foreign aid provided.21  
Expectations and the Reality 
Naturally, when unrest began in Egypt in 2011, many observers expected it to lead to a confrontation between secular 
forces in Egypt’s ruling group and Mubarak’s regime, who would attempt to maintain the stability of the country, and 
pro-Islamic, radical groups, who would push Egypt toward radicalization and instability.22 However, the reality 
 appeared different.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
assumption that authoritarian regimes were a guarantee of stability in the region,' he told the European Parliament.  ... His words 
echoed EU President Herman Van Rompuy's frank admission that the West had turned a blind eye to Mubarak's autocratic ways 
because he was a key moderating influence in the Middle East peace process. ... 'Until just a few weeks ago, Egypt was certainly not 
an issue, certainly not in terms of human rights. People preferred stability,' Van Rompuy said last month.” Alvise Armellini, “EU 
preparing fresh North Africa policy, but can it deliver?,” Monsters and Critics, March 2, 2011, 
http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/middleeast/news/article_1623194.php/ANALYSIS-EU-preparing-fresh-North-Africa-
policy-but-can-it-deliver, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011). 
 
19
 “Major non-NATO ally (MNNA) is a designation given by the United States government to close allies who have strategic working 
relationships with US armed forces but are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. ... Initial MNNAs were Australia, 
Egypt, Israel, Japan, and South Korea.” “Major Non-NATO Ally,” in Wikipedia, (last modified Nov. 29, 2011), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Major_non-NATO_ally,  (accessed Dec. 5, 2011).  
 
20
 Egypt has been a target of terrorist attacks at least seven times since 2001: 2004 Sinai bombings, April 2005 terrorist attacks in 
Cairo, 2005 Sharm el-Sheikh attacks, 2006 Dahab bombings, 2008 Sudan kidnapping, 2009 Khan el-Khalili bombing, 2011 al-Qidiseen 
church bombing. See “Terrorism in Egypt,” in Wikipedia, (last modified Oct. 4, 2011), 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorism_in_Egypt, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011). 
 
21
 Curt Tarnoff and Larry Nowels, “Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy,” Congressional Research 
Center, Report for Congress (last updated April 15, 2004), retrieved from http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31987.pdf, 
(accessed Dec. 5, 2011). 
 
22
 Ilan Berman writes, “According to a Pew opinion survey of Egyptians from June 2010, 59 percent said they back Islamists. Only 
27% said they back modernizers. Half of Egyptians support Hamas. Thirty percent support Hezbollah and 20% support al Qaida. 
Moreover, 95% of them would welcome Islamic influence over their politics… Eighty two percent of Egyptians support executing 
adulterers by stoning, 77% support whipping and cutting the hands off thieves. 84% support executing any Muslim who changes his 
religion. ... Egyptian values, in other words, are far from liberal—even if some of the protesters currently out in the streets might be. 
This, of course, runs counter to the idea that has taken hold in many quarters: that the end of the Mubarak era will inexorably lead 
to democracy in the heart of the Arab world. But numbers don’t lie; Egyptian society as a whole is both religious and deeply 
conservative.”  Ilan Berman, “What Egyptians Want: Not Western-Style Democracy,” Forbes, Feb. 2, 2011, 
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…“Mubarak’s supporters” …  
began attacking peaceful 
protestors…while law enforcement 
personnel did nothing to avoid 
mass violence. 
Protesters in the streets were ordinary people who demanded democracy, freedom, and the abolishment of the 
dictatorship of Mubarak’s regime.23 Radical Muslim forces had almost no role in the protests. For example, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which was considered the biggest and best-organized 
group opposing Mubarak’s regime, initially did not even support the 
protesters. When they finally joined, their position could hardly be 
seen as seeking specific Islamic objectives.24  
At the same time, the local government, which initially was 
considered as a guarantor of peace and stability, began aggravating 
the situation: radical groups of civilian “Mubarak’s supporters,” or 
more precisely, radical groups of plainclothes security forces, began 
attacking peaceful protestors—throwing the whole country into a violent confrontation, while law enforcement 
personnel did nothing to avoid mass violence. As a result of these clashes, many peaceful Egyptian citizens were killed 
and wounded.25 Due to the government’s “neutrality” and because many of the radicals attacking peaceful 
demonstrators turned out to have police and security agency ID cards,26 most observers believe the radical groups 
attacking peaceful demonstrators were orchestrated by Mubarak’s police and the security structures.27  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
23
 “Grievances of Egyptian protesters focused on legal and political issues including police brutality, state of emergency laws, lack of 
free elections and freedom of speech, uncontrollable corruption, as well as economic issues including high unemployment, food 
price inflation, and low minimum wages. The primary demands from protest organizers are the end of the Hosni Mubarak regime, 
the end of emergency law, freedom, justice, a responsive non-military government, and a say in the management of Egypt's 
resources. Strikes by labor unions added to the pressure on government officials.” “2011 Egyptian Revolution,” in Wikipedia, (last 
modified Dec. 1, 2011), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egyptian_revolution_of_2011, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011). 
 
24
 “The refusal of the Muslim Brotherhood to join the demonstrations at the beginning (it only joined them when they started to 
succeed! … led many to perceive it as a group of political opportunists. The Muslim Brotherhood had no other option but to arrange 
a few separate insignificant parallel demonstrations. It is important to note that the prayers that were held during the protests 
represented a common ritual level of Islam rather than an ideological movement belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood,” Tawfik 
Hamid, “Playing Chess with the Muslim Brotherhood,” The Jerusalem Post, Feb. 07, 2011, http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-
EdContributors/Article.aspx?id=207251, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011). Or see Heba Fahmy, “Muslim Brotherhood Reconsiders Refusal to 
Participate in Jan 25 Demo,” Daily News Egypt, Jan. 20, 2011, http://www.thedailynewsegypt.com/egypt/muslim-brotherhood-
reconsiders-refusal-to-participate-in-jan-25-demo.html, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011). 
 
25
 “By 1 February, the protests had left at least 125 people dead, although Human Rights Watch said that UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights Navi Pillay claimed that as many as 300 people may have died in the unrest. This unconfirmed tally included 80 
Human Rights Watch-verified deaths at two Cairo hospitals, 36 in Alexandria, and 13 in the port city of Suez, amongst others; over 
3,000 people were also reported as injured.” Retrieved from the Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. “2011 Egyptian Revolution,” in 
Wikipedia, (last modified Dec. 1, 2011), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egyptian_revolution_of_2011, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011).  
 
26
 The Toronto Star showed photos with this explanation: “I.D. cards of members of the Ministry of the Interior police force that anti-
government protesters say they confiscated from pro-Mubarak militias they captured—along with weapons—during violent clashes 
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This was NOT Mubarak’s regime attempting to guarantee  
the peace and stability…  
In fact, it would be more accurate to say the battle came to be between 
 ordinary people who were calling for freedom…  
against the Mubarak regime, which manipulated radical forces and  
pushed the country toward radicalization. 
Pro-government demonstrators, bottom, and anti-government demonstrators, top, clash in Tahrir Square. Source: AP 
28
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Toronto Star, Feb. 03, 2011, http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/933158--we-have-proof-mubarak-orchestrated-clashes-
protesters-say, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011). 
 
27
 “Violence escalated as waves of Mubarak supporters met anti-government protesters, and some Mubarak supporters rode on 
camels and horses into Tahrir Square. The clashes were believed to have been orchestrated by Habib El Adly, and there were 
hundreds of casualties. ... Incidents of violence toward journalists and reporters escalated amid speculation that the violence was 
being actively aggravated by Mubarak as a way to end the protests.” “2011 Egyptian Revolution,” in Wikipedia, (last modified Dec. 1, 
2011), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egyptian_revolution_of_2011, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011). 
 
28
 “500+ Injured in Violent Cairo Clash,” Daily Telegraph, Feb. 03, 2011, http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/mubarak-supporters-
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As the revolution in Egypt unfolded, it became evident that this was not the battle that had been expected. This 
was NOT Mubarak’s regime attempting to guarantee the peace and stability of the country and the region, while battling 
radical Islamic groups and a radicalized population trying to push the country toward confrontation and instability. In 
fact, it would be more accurate to say the battle came to be between ordinary people who were calling for freedom, 







Figure 1. Expectations before the unrests in Egypt were that Mubarak’s ruling group would be a guarantee of peace and 
stability, while the population of Egypt was perceived as primed for radicalization. In reality, during the unrest, Egypt’s 
population appeared to be inclined to peace, stability, and democracy, while Mubarak’s regime became a factor of 
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Making the societies of the Middle East part of a wider international 
community through Facebook, Twitter, and other networks could decisively 
influence the region’s fight for democracy and safety from radicalization. 
Necessity for Strategy Change 
The difference between the expectations and the reality in Egypt (and in the Middle East in general)29 should prompt the 
international community to devise a new strategy and a new approach to combat radicalization and strengthen the 
stability of the region. Old strategies based mainly on supporting the usually corrupt ruling group should be modified or 
abandoned. Instead, the international community should think about new strategies which could be oriented more to 
support the whole society (e.g., via civil society organizations), rather than only the local ruling groups.  
According the new strategy, the international community should direct its main efforts toward increasing the 
local population’s capability to withstand radicalization—or to withstand the radicals. Such support could be a part of 
wider efforts to strengthen the local society’s ability to achieve democratic transformation and development. This 
approach would oppose the methods used by the authoritarian system that encourages ordinary citizens to feel 
responsible only to those in the ruling group (clergy, royal family, dictator, ruling party, etc.) and not to care about the 
future of their country or society.  
Recent events have demonstrated that creation of media and communication platforms that are independent 
and free from the control of authoritarian regimes and radical groups’ control can make an impact in the fight for 
democracy. Making the societies of the Middle East part of a wider international community through Facebook, Twitter, 
and other networks could decisively influence the region’s fight for democracy and safety from radicalization.30  
                                                          
29
 In the case of Libya, Gaddafi forces behaved just as did forces in Egypt; initially Gaddafi tried to blame violence on the opposition 
linked with radical Islamic forces (see “Gaddafi Blames Osama Bin Laden for Protests,” BBC News, Feb. 24, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12570279), (accessed Dec. 5, 2011). Later, Gaddafi’s government declared that it had 
established an alliance with Islamic forces and intended to convert Libya to an Islamic state (“Qaddafi's Son Says Regime Is Forging 
Alliance With Radical Islamists,” Fox News, Aug. 04, 2011, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/08/03/qaddafis-son-says-regime-
is-forging-alliance-with-radical-islamists/, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011).  
  
30
 “In the case of Egypt it really played a critical factor in getting out the word on how to organize. … There was one group in Egypt 
that was one of the key groups in getting people out on the street. ... Last week in a matter of days they went from 20,000 fans to 
80,000 fans. ... We can see that these sites were used in order to get the word out about how to bypass checkpoints, how to get 
across bridges, how to get to places where people wanted to demonstrate. So it was a critical tool in getting people out into the 
streets." “Uprising in Egypt; Mubarak Shuts Down Al Jazeera,” CNN Transcripts, Jan. 30, 2011, 
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From this point of view, 
strengthening international 
cooperation with civil society 
groups in Egypt… 
looms even more important. 
Latest Developments and Final Remarks  
Continued clashes with government forces in Egypt, as well as the 
advancement of Islamic parties in recent parliamentary elections 
show that Egypt’s civil society so far has not been able to create the 
ideological platforms necessary to move from protests toward active 
political work. Although Egypt’s civil society quite clearly expressed 
that it would no longer accept the dictatorship in Egypt and was able 
to force Mubarak’s withdrawal from power, Egypt remains in a period of transition that may be long and difficult before 
it will realize the aspirations of the January 2011 revolution31 and prove able to form institutions which will preserve the 
country from the threat of radicalization. From this point of view, strengthening international cooperation with civil 
society groups in Egypt (which is the recommendation given in this article) looms even more important.     
The pattern just described does not seem only to reflect the situation in Egypt, but also in most of the states of the 
Middle East where the local regimes and radical groups tend to treat their own people as a threat to their power rather than 
as a source of power. This attitude creates the background for radicalization. Even when well-known leaders like Mubarak are 
removed, the situation in these states will not improve at once, as it will require time to completely replace old ruling 
structures with new democratic institutes.32 This too is why more specific plans and approaches relevant to the new reality of 
supporting the democratic aspirations of local societies is of the highest importance, and will be for a long time to come.   
 
Irakli Mchedlishvili is a board member of the Civil Council on Defense and Security, a nongovernmental organization 
based in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a member of the Combating Terrorism Working Group of the PfP Consortium of Defense 
Academies and Security Studies Institutes. 
                                                          
 
31
 Mohamed El Baradei, a Nobel Prize laureate and Egypt's top reformist leader, said, "We'll have to keep fighting ... the revolution is 
still a work in progress." Sarah El Deeb and Marjorie Olster, “ElBaradei: Egypt Vote 'Decimated' Liberals,” Time, Dec. 04, 2011, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2101473,00.html#ixzz1fwlu54it, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011). Practically the same 
thought is expressed by Emad El-Din Shahin, Henry R. Luce Associate Professor in his article where he describes the Nov. 22–26, 
2011, Cairo clashes and the background of the conflict. See “Why Egypt Needs a Second Revolution,” CNN, Nov. 23, 2011, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/11/22/opinion/shahin-egypt/index.html, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011).  
 
32
 It is true that the 2011 revolution opened the door for changes, but in Egypt old state institutions are still functioning, and change 
will require a lot of time and serious effort from both Egyptians and Egypt’s international partners  (e.g., see George Friedman, “The 
Distance between Enthusiasm and Reality,” STRATFOR, Feb. 14, 2011, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110213-egypt-distance-
between-enthusiasm-and-reality, (accessed Dec. 5, 2011). Also see Barry Rubin, “How Much in Egypt Has Really Changed? Less Than 
It Seems,” American Thinker, Feb. 12, 2011, http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/02/how_much_in_egypt_has_really_c.html, 
(accessed Dec. 5, 2011). From the structural point of view, revolution in Egypt is not yet finished and the continued demonstrations 
of Egyptians is a proof of this fact. See, Al Pessin, “Protesters Say Egypt’s Revolution Far From Finished,”, Voice of America, July 15, 
2011, http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Protesters-Say-Egypts-Revolution-Far-From-Finished-125664003.html, 
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Figure 1. Map of Africa  
showing the location of Uganda 
…the LRA has admitted to cooking body parts of the dead and then feeding 
those parts to close relatives of the victim.  
Combating Terrorism:  
 A Ugandan Perspective 
by Major David Munyua 
Background: Terrorism in Uganda 
“Uganda is truly the pearl of Africa,” said Sir Winston Churchill. Many people would agree with that description, saying 
this small country in Eastern Africa that lies on the equator has been blessed with the best nature can offer humanity. 
However, that endowment has not prevented Uganda from suffering terrorist threats and acts. Local terrorists 
orchestrated the attacks, while most of the threats came from international terrorist groups. Because of these actions 
and threats, the Ugandan Parliament enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2002, shortly after the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. 
The Act defined terrorism as “Any act of violence or 
threat of violence carried out for purposes of 
influencing government or intimidating the 
public and for a political, religious, 
social and economic aim, 
indiscriminately without due 
regard for the safety of others or 
property.”  
 
It should be noted that most 
local terrorists in Uganda originated as 
insurgents who failed to win the support of the 
population. Over time, these groups began resorting to coercing and forcing local people to 







Vol. 2, No.1      CTX 
 
When the National Resistance 
Army/Movement (NRM) came into power in 
Uganda in 1986, many insurgent groups emerged to 
fight it, including the Holy Spirit Movement, Uganda 
People’s Democratic Army, Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA), Force Obote Back, West Nile Bank Front (I 
and II), Allied Democratic Front (ADF), and People’s 
Redemption Army, among many others. Out of all 
those, the LRA and ADF crossed the line into 
terrorism. Most of the other groups were either 
defeated or entered into a settlement with the 
NRM government. Many of the still-active leaders 
of those insurgent groups currently serve either within the ranks of the NRM or as members of the Uganda People’s 
Defence Forces (UPDF), the nation’s armed forces.  
Acts by the LRA and ADF introduced Ugandans to terrorism. The LRA says it is fighting because it wants to rule 
Uganda according to the Ten Commandments in the Bible, and the group has been trained and facilitated by external 
forces, including some sovereign countries. LRA members have committed despicable atrocities against the people of 
northern Uganda, including abducting young boys to force them to join their ranks; taking young girls for sex; cutting off 
the limbs, ears, and lips of local people; and killing innocent civilians indiscriminately. If those actions were not 
excruciating enough, the LRA has admitted to 
cooking body parts of the dead and then feeding 
those parts to close relatives of the victim. As a 
result, many Ugandans were forced to abandon their 
villages and live in internally displaced people’s (IDP) 
camps where the UPDF could effectively protect 
them. These acts of terrorism by the LRA were not 
committed only against Ugandans but also against 
innocent people in Southern Sudan, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic. 
The LRA thus was transformed from a local terrorist 
organization into a regional/international one. 
Figure 2. Map of Uganda. (Microsoft Encarta map) 
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Figure 4. LRA leader Joseph Kony. (Source: clip from video 
 captured from LRA) 
The ADF, just like the LRA, received training and 
facilitation from some external forces. One of their main 
objectives was to rule Uganda using Sharia law. They 
operated from the eastern areas of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), committing atrocities against the 
people of western Uganda and eastern DRC—raiding and 
burning down schools and villages, and killing innocent 
people indiscriminately. ADF not only terrorized the rural 
population, but they also used clandestine operatives to 
plant improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in commuter 
taxis, buses, bars, and busy streets in Kampala City. They 
also abducted and ruthlessly killed some civilians who 
refused to cooperate with them. 
 
Figure 5. ADF leader Sheikh Jamil Mukulu. (Source: photograph captured from  
ADF camp in DRC) 
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Figure 7. Scene of bomb blast in a bar (Source: Photo from a 
JAT official) 
The American embassy in Uganda was on 
Al Qaeda’s list of possible targets when the U.S. 
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania, were simultaneously bombed on August 
7, 1998. Al Qaeda continues to threaten Uganda, 
which has more recently begun to receive threats 
from Al Shabaab also. Al Shabaab is an Islamist 
terrorist organization directly linked to Al Qaeda 
that operates in war-torn Somalia and wants 
Ugandan and Burundian peacekeepers out of 
Somalia. They made several suicide and direct 
attacks on UPDF bases in Mogadishu, a port city in Somalia, as well as performing roadside ambushes and also trying on 
several occasions to infiltrate into Uganda and attack from within. Indeed, on July 11, 2010, Al Shabaab used suicide 
bombers in two separate attacks in Kampala City to kill 76 football fans watching World Cup finals. Since then, they have 
continued to issue threats of attacks within Uganda and Burundi. 
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Uganda introduced what it calls “community policing,” …local people [supplementing] the 
effort of the police by identifying and reporting suspicious elements within the community. 
Figure 9. U.S. embassy Nairobi after being bombed in 
1998. (Source: The New York Times) 
Uganda’s Response to 
Terrorism 
Faced with these real challenges, Uganda had 
to act very quickly to curb the deteriorating 
security situation. The government 
approached the problem from two angles: 
preventive actions and deliberate, disruptive 
interventions. Before bomb attacks in 
Kampala City and Jinja Municipality in 1999, 
the security forces—including the police, 
military, intelligence services, and private 
security firms—all worked independently. To ensure efficient use of scarce resources and to produce effective results, 
the Joint Anti-Terrorism (JAT) Task Force, an interagency unit, was created.  JAT includes representatives from all 
security agencies, and its leader reports to a security committee which comprises all security agencies and is chaired by 
the police chief–inspector general of police. 
 
Figure 10. ADF urban operatives captured and 
paraded before the press. (Source: JAT photo) 
More significantly, JAT could not 
have succeeded without the involvement 
of the population. Uganda introduced what 
it calls “community policing,” literally 
meaning that local people will supplement 
the effort of the police by identifying and 
reporting suspicious elements within the 
community. People are watching each 





Vol. 2, No.1      CTX 
 
Terrorists change their tactics 
with advances in technology; 
therefore, security agencies must 
stay on their toes to recognize and 
defend against any new high-tech 
tools terrorists may be  
planning to use.  
that is unusual in their neighborhood, and informing the police for 
immediate action. This effort also involved empowering and 
educating the population about terrorism through regular village 
meetings with the police. 
The Anti-Terrorism Act of 2002 also solved a legal problem 
the police and the directorate of public prosecution had been facing, 
by saying that terrorists will no longer be treated like other criminals 
who are charged under the penal code. Instead, terrorists are to be 
charged under a separate criminal law. 
As urban terrorism was being addressed through these measures, the Ugandan military also intensified efforts 
to eliminate terrorist activities in rural areas. To succeed, the military needed to attack these terrorists in their hideouts 
and points of origin and to ensure that their supply lines were blocked. As fighting occurred on the battleground, 
diplomatic efforts were also made to ensure that the UPDF could cross the borders into both the DRC and Southern 
Sudan to deal with the terrorist groups. These efforts proved mostly successful. 
Given the fact that some of the combatants had been abducted and indoctrinated by the terrorist groups, 
Parliament introduced the idea of amnesty for such fighters. Therefore, the amnesty law of 2000 allowed the 
government to peacefully welcome home those who denounced their evil acts against innocent civilians. In addition, 
resettlement packages were given to those who were captured, surrendered, or came out of the bush through peace 
talks and officially applied for amnesty. 
Threats from Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab 
still cause discomfort for the leadership of the 
country. Although the LRA is more than 600 
kilometers from the border of Uganda, the 
group should not be forgotten or ignored as 
long as the forces that kept them operational 
for many years still exist. Terrorists change their 
tactics with advances in technology; therefore, 
security agencies must stay on their toes to 
recognize and defend against any new high-tech 
tools terrorists may be planning to use.  
Figure11. Weapons and ammunition captured from LRA.  
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…challenges still exist that require 
even stronger cooperation…  
 “a pain on any part of the body 
affects the whole body.” 
At the regional level, the East African Community inter-forces cooperation and partnership made tracking of 
terrorists groups a little easier. The forces share information and intelligence that can be used to prevent terrorist 
activities in the region. This effort is also supported by the governments of each country. For instance, the suspects in 
the July 2010 Kampala terrorist attacks were extradited from Kenya and Tanzania to Uganda. The Democratic Republic 
of Congo and the Central African Republic, which are not members of EAC, also cooperated with Uganda to allow UPDF 
to cross their borders and jointly fight the LRA in their countries. The Republic of South Sudan has been in partnership 
with Uganda since 1987, long before that country officially gained independence on July 9, 2011. This partnership 
contributed greatly toward winning the fight against the LRA in northern Uganda and Southern Sudan. The passage of 
the LRA Disarmament Bill by the U.S. Congress in May 2010 also provided another strong CT partner for fighting—and 
hopefully eliminating—the LRA problem in the region. 
Whereas regional CT efforts are already in place, challenges still exist that require even stronger cooperation 
and partnership. Not all the countries in the Great Lakes region of Africa have laws to address terrorism. That lack 
directly affects regional efforts to battle terrorism, especially when a 
terrorist act is committed in a country that lacks the relevant laws. 
These efforts are also hampered by continued support given to 
terrorists by some countries within and outside of Africa, differing 
levels of CT training and awareness within the Great Lakes countries, 
and the varied threats to the individual countries, which in part 
determines their strategic priorities.  
I wish we could all appreciate that “a pain on any part of the body affects the whole body.” If all countries in the 
region would respond with one voice and take action against terrorism, the efforts would enjoy greater success.  
The threat of terrorism is real and it affects every country. Partnering to counter terrorists is the most effective 
way to apply our resources.   
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 …there is the potential for a major 
backlash from radical Islamists 
around the world, a backlash that  
we should be preparing for now. 
The Forgotten Jihadist 
by Dr. Brian Nussbam 
Much ink has been spilled recently about the potential 
impact of the deaths of Osama Bin Laden and Anwar al-
Awlaki.  Analysts, pundits, experts, and others have 
widely questioned whether their deaths increase the li 
kelihood of terror attacks in the short term, whether they 
will cause the jihadist movement to fracture and fray, 
whether they will, in the longer term, lead to the demise 
of the movement for which the men were great symbols.   
 These are all worthwhile 
and important questions that 
need to be answered.  However, 
in the frenzy to find meaning in 
the death of these terrorists, 
and frankly in the years prior to 
those deaths, a major figure in 
the same movement has been forgotten.  This man will 
also die soon, and his death will also be blamed—at least 
by some—on the United States: Sheikh Omar 
Abdel-Rahman. 
 Abdel-Rahman, currently imprisoned in North 
Carolina, is one of the most important figures in radical 
Islamist thought of the past century.  Not only is he 
intellectually important to the movement, but outside 
the United States he is widely seen as one of its key 
symbolic figures.  Born in 1938, Abdel-Rahman has been 
in poor health for at least the last decade and is unlikely 
to live much longer.  When Abdel-Rahman dies in a U. S. 
prison facility—as he inevitably will in the near future—
there is the potential for a major backlash from radical 
Islamists around the world, a backlash that we should be 
preparing for now. 
 Abdel-Rahman is, arguably at least, as important 
to the global jihadist movement as Bin Laden was.  While 
he never had the notoriety, nor the riches-to-
revolutionary-rags life story of the Al Qaeda leader, 
Abdel-Rahman has substantially deeper religious 
credibility in the Muslim world 
and a gravitas that Bin Laden 
could never match.  He was the 
religious guide and theological 
sanctioner of violence for 
several revolutionary Islamist 
organizations in Egypt, including 
Gamaa Islamiyah and Tanzim al Jihad, from the 1970s 
through the 1990s. 
 Known in the United States mostly as “The Blind 
Sheikh,” Abdel-Rahman in the 1990s lived in New York 
and New Jersey while serving as one of the key U.S. 
representatives of the Maktab al Khidamat (the “services 
bureau”), the organization Bin Laden co-founded with 
Palestinian Abdullah Azzam to support the jihad in 
Afghanistan which was a precursor to Al Qaeda.  Abdel-
Rahman gained notoriety when he was linked to the men 
responsible for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade 
Center. In 1995 he was convicted on charges of “seditious 
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 Abdel-Rahman was, according to 
journalist Peter Bergen, the  
first figure in the movement to give 
“religious sanction to attacks on 
American aviation, shipping, and 
economic targets.” 
New York City area.  That plot was purported to include 
such targets as the United Nations, the Lincoln and 
Holland Tunnels, the George Washington Bridge, and a 
federal building.  Sentenced to life in prison, Abdel-
Rahman is currently housed in the Butner Federal 
Medical Center in North Carolina. 
 Abdel-Rahman’s importance to the global jihadist 
movement goes far beyond what most Americans know 
about him.  Abdel-Rahman was, according to journalist 
Peter Bergen, the first figure in the movement to give 
“religious sanction to attacks on American aviation, 
shipping, and economic 
targets.”33  A fatwa attributed to 
Abdel-Rahman, and purportedly 
issued in the mid-1990s from his 
prison cell in the United States, 
called for all Muslims to cut off 
relations with Americans, 
Christians, and Jews, and to:  
tear them to pieces,  
destroy their economies, burn their 
corporations, destroy their peace,  
sink their ships, shoot down their planes, 
and kill them on sea, land and air.34 
 Unlike similar fatwas by Osama Bin Laden and 
current Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abdel-
Rahman is deemed by many to actually have the religious 
credentials to call for such attacks.  Bin Laden (trained as 
an engineer) and Zawahiri (trained as a surgeon) lack the 
                                                          
33
 Peter L. Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I know (New York: 
Free Press, 2006), Page 206. 
34
 Peter L. Bergen, The Longest War (New York: Free Press, 
2011), Page 29-30. 
 
proper religious bona fides to issue such fatwas, or 
religious rulings.  Abdel-Rahman, on the other hand, has 
impeccable religious credentials, including a doctorate 
from Al Azhar University—an Egyptian institution that is 
considered the most illustrious religious university in the 
Islamic world.   
 In fact, so central is Abdel-Rahman to the 
movement that some of Al Qaeda’s discussions and 
planning regarding potential operations were purportedly 
designed to help secure his release.  Some of the threat 
information that came into federal intelligence agencies 
in the summer of 2001—a 
period during which the 9/11 
Commission reported “the 
system was blinking red”—had 
to do with potential Al Qaeda 
operations tied directly to 
Abdel-Rahman.  According to an 
excerpt of a declassified 
intelligence report, available 
from CNN, there were unconfirmed reports that Al Qaeda 
operatives in the United States were involved in plots to 
secure Abdel-Rahman’s release that included hijacking an 
aircraft.  For example:  
We have not been able to corroborate some of 
the more sensational threat reporting, such as 
that from a [redacted] service in 1998 saying that 
Bin Ladin wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain 
the release of “Blind Sheikh” Umar Abd al-
Rahman and other US held extremists.35 
                                                          
35
 Presidents Daily Briefing – Aug 6, 2001.  “Bin Laden 
Determined to Strike in US”,  retrieved from CNN website 
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…demands include ending air 
and drone strikes in numerous 
countries, shutting down the 
detention facility at  
Guantanamo Bay, and  
releasing detained jihadists like  
Ramzi Yousef.  This list of 
demands reads like a primer 
on jihadist gripes… 
 The system was “blinking 
red” before the attacks of 
September 2001, and at least some 
of that intelligence was tied to 
Abdel-Rahman.  And Abdel-
Rahman’s galvanizing effect 
continues.  
 
 In early December 2011, Al 
Qaeda’s media office As-Sahab 
(The Clouds) released a new video 
featuring Zawahiri, in which he 
threatens the life of an American hostage and makes 
numerous demands of the United States.  These —and, 
notably, one of the eight demands Zawahiri made 
included: 
Releasing Shaykh Omar Abdulrahman, 
and dropping all the charges against him 
and stopping any legal pursuit of him, 






                                                                                                        
10/politics/august6.memo_1_bin-conduct-terrorist-attacks-
abu-zubaydah?_s=PM:ALLPOLITICS  (Accessed Jan 6, 2012)   
36
 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Message of Hope and Glad Tidings For 
Our People in Egypt, Episode 8” (December 1, 2011), retrieved 
from Flashpoint Partners website: 
http://www.globalterroralert.com/images/documents/pdf/020
7/flashpoint_zawahiri120111.pdf/ (accessed December 3, 
2011).  
It is fairly clear that Abdel-
Rahman was, and remains today, a 
major figure in the global jihadist 
movement.  Less clear is what his 
inevitable death in a U.S. prison 
will mean for the movement—or 
what it will mean for U.S. security.  
There is reason for concern. In a 
“will” released at the same time as 
his influential fatwa, Abdel-
Rahman said “If they [the 
Americans] kill me …do not let my 
blood be shed in vain.  Rather, extract the most 
 violent revenge…. 
 
Dr. Brian Nussbaum teaches Terrorism and Political 
Violence at the Rockefeller College of Public Affairs at the 
State University of Albany.  His work has appeared in 
journals including Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and 
Global Crime and in numerous edited volumes.  The 
opinions included here are his and are not representative 
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…she grants insight into  
significant indigenous economic, 
political, and social factors that  
even the Middle East Studies 
academic community failed to 
accurately forecast in advance of 
the Arab Spring. 
The Written Word: 
Rock the Casbah 
Reviewed by Dr. Dona J. Stewart 
Robin Wright ,  Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion Across the Islamic World (New York: 
Simon & Schuster), 2011. ISBN: 978-1-4391-0316-6. 
 
en years after 9/11, Robin Wright provides a 
fresh look at the Islamic world and how it has 
changed in the past decade. Her well-
documented and in-depth 
account is informed by Wright’s 
decades of experience covering 
the Middle East for a wide  
range of news outlets. This book 
is of great value to the 
counterterrorism community as 
well as others who seek a 
nuanced understanding of the 
region’s population during this 
tumultuous revolutionary period.  
 Wright argues that two dramatic, related events 
currently define the region: the shattering of the old order 
in the Arab Spring and the societal rejection of extremism. 
She terms this “rejection of the specific violent 
movements as well as the principle of violence to achieve 
political goals” the counter jihad (p. 3). 
 While acknowledging that violent extremism still 
poses a threat, Wright focuses on the actions, events, and 
attitudes that compose the counter jihad. She reveals the 
lesser-known struggles of the population to shape their 
own destiny, often countering violent extremism in ways 
ranging from the mundane to the remarkable. In  
doing so, she grants insight into significant indigenous 
economic, political, and social factors that even the 
Middle East Studies academic 
community failed to accurately 
forecast in advance of the Arab 
Spring.37 
 For instance, in Egypt, 
the youth-led movement that 
overthrew Mubarak managed to 
achieve in 18 days a goal that 
had eluded Al Qaeda for 
decades. Indeed, the speed and 
success of the Arab revolts took Al Qaeda by surprise, 
leaving its leaders scrambling to adjust their narrative and 
embrace the revolts. Wright notes that in an era defined 
by Twitter, Al Qaeda’s statement—released on video—
seemed out of touch. She declares, “Al Qaeda is not dead, 
even with Bin Laden’s death ten years after 9/11, but it is 
increasingly passé” (p. 5).  
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 Hip-hop lyrics of Moroccan singer Soultana: 
 You bring hell to our world, you bring misunderstandin’…  
Now you represent no Muslim, because al Qaeda is hell… Shame on you… 
 The Western model, epitomized by 
leaders such as Egypt’s Mubarak and 
Tunisia’s Ben Ali, fails to meet the needs 
of the region’s growing, and 
extremely youthful, population. 
A major force driving the counter jihad is the 
general disgust with the tactics of militant groups such as 
Al Qaeda. Muslims declared their rejection of Al Qaeda in 
venues from large-scale demonstrations in Mumbai where 
thousands took to the streets to condemn the 2008 
terrorist attacks, declaring “killers of innocents are 
enemies of Islam,” to the hip-hop lyrics of Moroccan 
singer Soultana: 
You bring hell to our world, you bring misunderstandin’… 
Now you represent no Muslim, because al Qaeda is hell … 
Shame on you, shame on your people. 
 In addition to ire over the group’s tactics, 
opposition rose in response to bin Laden’s leadership 
style, leading even some of his closest supporters to turn 
their backs on his movement. Noman Benotman, a 
founding member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and 
close associate of bin Laden, broke with Al Qaeda in 2003. 
He viewed bin Laden’s strategy of targeting the United 
States as a miscalculation that would bring the full weight 
of American military power to bear on the group. Pettier 
reasons have driven others away; Sudanese informant 
Jamal al Fadl left because his pay scale was lower than 
that of the Egyptians. 
 Wright claims that the publication of Sheikh 
Salman al Oudah’s open letter to bin Laden marked 2007 
as the symbolic turning point for the counter jihad.  In his 
letter, as quoted by Wright, al Oudah offered some of the 
harshest public criticism of bin Laden: 
I say to my brother Osama, how much blood has 
been spilt? How many innocent people, children, 
elderly, and women have been killed, maimed, or 
banished in the name of al Qaeda? Will you be 
happy to meet God almighty carrying the burden 
of these hundreds of thousands if not millions, of 
innocent people on your back? (p. 65) 
 
 Al Oudah went on to say that bin Laden has 
brought ruin to the entire Muslim world. This criticism 
from such a strong supporter of jihad carried much 
weight. Al Oudah, a Saudi sheikh, had issued a fatwa 
against the Saudi government in 1990 for allowing foreign, 
infidel troops to be stationed in the kingdom, a fatwa bin 
Laden used to justify his own activities. Al Oudah had also 
endorsed jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan and 
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29-year-old Dalia Ziada, an activist 
who translated into Arabic a  
comic book about Reverend  
Martin Luther King’s 1955 civil 
disobedience campaign.  
“defensive jihads.” Indeed, bin Laden’s first fatwa 
condemned imprisonment of the sheikh by Saudi 
authorities from 1994 to 1999.  
 The 2007 renunciation of extremism in by Sayyid 
Imam al-Sharif, also known as Dr. Fadl, proved a further 
blow to the Al Qaeda movement. The former leader of the 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and founding member of Al Qaeda, 
was considered Al Qaeda’s chief ideologue. In a 1,000 
page-long book, he provided justification for killing 
anyone, of any religion, who disagreed with Al Qaeda. But 
in 2007, al-Sharif reversed course, writing from an 
Egyptian prison that Muslims are prohibited from 
committing aggression against anyone of any religion and 
condemning the 9/11 attacks.  
 Wright emphasizes that 
any societal rejection of Al 
Qaeda should not be 
misinterpreted as an embrace of 
the United States or the West. 
The Western model, epitomized 
by leaders such as Egypt’s 
Mubarak and Tunisia’s Ben Ali, fails to meet the needs of 
the region’s growing, and extremely youthful, population. 
The incident in Tunisia that sparked widespread revolution 
was rooted in the rampant corruption and daily 
hopelessness that marked peoples’ lives under these 
largely secular and pro-Western regimes. When an 
inspector confiscated Muhammad Bouazizi’s wares from 
his fruit cart because he did not have a permit, Bouazizi 
sought redress at the town hall and governor’s office; he 
was turned away at both. The sole breadwinner for an 
extended family of eight, he lit himself on fire, declaring, 
“How do you expect me to earn a living?” 
 At age 25, Bouazizi was a member of “Generation 
U,” Muslim youth under the age of 30 who, Wright says, 
are “unfulfilled, unincluded, underemployed or 
underutilized, and underestimated” (p. 91). Though they 
may reject Al Qaeda, they have strong reservations about 
the West and are likely to want their countries to take a 
more independent course in their external relations. Many 
of them have studied the West and share values that align 
with American ideals. At the same time, they may 
embrace Islamist parties, drawn by the latter’s effective 
organization and strong social justice message, a marked 
contrast to the corruption-laden old guard. But this 
generation is also not seeking a new set of authoritarians 
operating under the guise of 
religion.  
 Wright’s anecdotes and 
interviews, especially with the 
youth, and recounted in 
chapters titled “Hip-Hop Islam,” 
“The Living Poets Society” and 
“Satellite Sheikhs and You Tube 
Imams,” illustrate the energy and idealism that has rocked 
regimes long thought stable. For example, there is 29-
year-old Dalia Ziada, an activist who translated into Arabic 
a comic book about Reverend Martin Luther King’s 1955 
civil disobedience campaign. A total of 2,000 copies 
containing accounts about acts like Rosa Park’s refusal to 
move to the back of the bus were distributed across the 
Middle East. Ziada also defied Egyptian authorities by 
hosting the Cairo Human Rights Film Festival, secretly 
screening the banned movies on a dinner cruise boat. At 
the same time, Dalia is also a survivor of female genital 
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 The title of Wright’s book, 
 Rock the Casbah, alludes to a 
song by the English punk band, The 
Clash.  A fictitious Middle 
Eastern king bans rock music. 
family’s embrace of this 
cultural—not Islamic—tradition, a 
reminder that nearly every facet 
of economic, social, and political 
life in the region is currently 
contested.  
Another individual Wright 
discusses is Hamada Ben Amor, a 21-year-old Tunisian 
rapper. His songs, posted on Facebook and YouTube 
shortly before the Jasmine Revolution, took Tunisian 
President Ben Ali to task, stating what many felt, but few 
dared to say: 
They steal in plain sight, 
No need to name them,  
You know very well who they are.  
A lot of money should have gone to development, 
To schools, to hospitals, to housing. 
But the sons of dogs, 
Are instead filling their stomachs. 
Mr. President, your people are dead.  
 
Another refrain called on Ben Ali to: 
Go down to the street and look around you, 
People are treated like animals. 
Look at the cops, 
Their batons beat everyone with impunity, 
Because there is no one to say no, 
Not even the law or the constitution. 
 
 Although the outcome of 
the Arab Spring remains unclear, 
members of Generation U are 
bound to form a large part of the 
region’s future leadership. As 
such, they will influence the 
direction of their countries’ 
foreign policies and positions on a wide array of issues, to 
include partnerships in the fight against terrorism and 
extremism. A greater understanding of the grievances, 
hopes, and goals of this generation is essential to forming 
effective and lasting partnerships.  
 The title of Wright’s book, Rock the Casbah, 
alludes to a song by the English punk band, The Clash.  A 
fictitious Middle Eastern king bans rock music. The people 
revolt, so the king calls out his jet fighters to bomb them, 
but the pilots refuse and instead play rock music in  
their cockpits.  
 Nearly 30 years after this song was released, the 
Tunisian military refused to fire on civilians and pledged to 
support that revolution.38 
 
 
Dr. Dona J. Stewart is a Senior Resident Fellow at Joint 
Special Operations University. She is a specialist in the 
human and political geography of the Middle East, a 
former Fulbright scholar to Jordan, and the author of The 
Middle East Today: Political, Geographical and Cultural  
Perspectives (Routledge). 
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…practitioners and policymakers  
have grown weary from the myriad 
criticisms published about  
U.S. counterterrorism strategy  
within the last decade… 
a well-written, non-
ideologically motivated 
analysis of U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts that 
inspires hope and optimism 
has been all too rare.  
Counterstrike 
Reviewed by Dr. James J. F. Forest  
Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, Counterstrike: The Untold Story of America’s Secret 
Campaign Against al-Qaeda. (New York: Current Events), 2011. ISBN: 978 -0-8050-9103-8. 
 
t is only natural that practitioners and policymakers 
have grown weary from the myriad criticisms 
published about U.S. 
counterterrorism strategy within 
the last decade. Whether laying 
blame for why the United States 
failed to capture or kill Osama bin 
Laden at Tora Bora in  
2001, vilifying the intelligence 
community for perceived failures 
of imagination, or serving up 
saucy details of supposedly 
private conversations in the White 
House, authors and their 
publishers have enjoyed much 
success and publicity from their 
criticism-laced best-sellers. By contrast, a well-written, 
non-ideologically motivated analysis of U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts that inspires hope and optimism 
has been all too rare.  
But now, New York Times national security 
correspondents Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker offer an 
important counterweight with their new book, 
Counterstrike.  While focused on people and strategies 
that most Americans have never heard of, it is also written 
with the sensibilities of journalists who know how to make 
complex topics readable. Their interwoven stories and 
interesting characters are made all the more compelling 
upon realizing that the events 
they describe really happened.  
Drawing on their 
impressive access at all levels of 
the government, the authors 
describe how the U.S. government 
has quietly developed and 
implemented a counterterrorism 
strategy that integrates kinetic 
and nonkinetic instruments of 
national power. The SOF and 
counterterrorism community will 
especially appreciate the book’s 
robust description and analysis of 
modern, networked, asymmetric threats. Schmitt and 
Shanker also aptly illustrate the absolute necessity of 
working closely with other countries (both officially and 
unofficially) to identify and utilize new ways of diminishing 
Al Qaeda's capabilities to organize or inspire terrorists 
attacks. There can be no doubt that Al Qaeda is an enemy 
of the world, not just the United States, thus the crucial 
importance of partnering in a global effort to constrain the 
financing, safe havens, and ideological support that gives 
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 Surely there are ideas and  
lessons that can be drawn and 
incorporated into the fight against 
terrorism elsewhere in the world, 
particularly in places like Colombia, 
Lebanon, India, Algeria, Pakistan, 
Kashmir, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines… 
Readers should pay 
special attention to the authors’ 
discussions about the 
application of deterrence theory 
to defeating Al Qaeda. For me, 
this is where we find the real 
meat of the book. The authors 
ask, “What do terrorist groups 
hold dear?” Then they answer, 
drawing on the work of 
Matthew Kroenig and Barry Pavel—two big thinkers at the 
Pentagon who realized that terrorists do have certain 
kinds of physical and virtual “territory” they worry about 
protecting. Examples include operational mobility; 
personal glory and reputation; chances of operational 
success; dependable supporters, weapons, finances, in-
group trust and cohesion; family well-being; and safe 
havens. But perhaps the most important terrain terrorist 
groups try to defend is the ideological: the history books 
are littered with the skeletons of groups that were unable 
to secure lasting resonance for their ideologies. Thus, the 
authors devote an entire chapter to the important and 
evolving effort to counter Al Qaeda’s message. 
Knowing what terrorists value, and what they 
worry about, highlights the kinds of organizational 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited to influence their 
behavior and diminish their capabilities. This kind of 
thinking about terrorism—in which nuance, patience, and 
context have primacy over the use of more dramatic kinds 
of “warheads on foreheads” instruments of warfare—will 
be welcomed by many in the counterterrorism 
community. It is also a kind of thinking that will very likely 
give the average American a 
sense of optimism about the 
eventual demise of Al Qaeda. 
Having served as Director of 
Terrorism Studies at West Point 
(2004–2010)and now as a Senior 
Fellow at Joint Special 
Operations University, I've read 
widely and written and taught 
courses about a lot of topics 
relevant to the readers of CTX. Counterstrike is the first 
book I have read that provides such a well-researched, 
engaging, accessible, and insightful account of how the 
U.S. has been quietly and successfully exploiting the 
inherent vulnerabilities of a terrorist network. 
While the book generates optimism about the 
eventual, inevitable demise of Al Qaeda, it also serves as 
an important case study for an international audience of 
scholars, policymakers, and practitioners of 
counterterrorism. My only criticism of the book is that 
although the authors explain how the U.S. has adapted 
Thomas Schelling’s Cold War deterrence theories for the 
fight against Al Qaeda, there is virtually no reflection on 
the implications of these theories for combating other 
significant terrorist groups. Surely there are ideas and 
lessons that can be drawn and incorporated into the fight 
against terrorism elsewhere in the world, particularly in 
places like Colombia, Lebanon, India, Algeria, Pakistan, 
Kashmir, Indonesia, and the Philippines, among others. 
Despite the many ideological differences that animate 
terrorists around the globe, they face common challenges 
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support, and—most importantly—in achieving anything 
worthwhile through the use of violence. Governments 
must use every tool at their disposal, including the 
theories of deterrence as described in Counterstrike, to 
make these challenges increasingly difficult for the 
terrorists, to the point where they implode and then 
decay into oblivion, like countless other terrorist groups 
throughout history. 
In sum, this book is a welcome addition to the 
growing literature on what can be called influence 
warfare, a way of conceptualizing the multi-faceted 
struggle to shape perceptions and behavior in an age of 
globalized information technologies. The authors have an 
important story to share, and they do so in a way that 
readers in many countries will find engaging and 
accessible. In additions, the book highlights the kind of 
sophisticated thinking about terrorism that true CT 
practitioners will surely appreciate. 
 
 
Dr. James J. F. Forest is a Senior Fellow for the Joint Special 
Operations University and an Associate Professor at the 
University of Massachusetts Lowell. He served on the 
faculty at West Point for nine years, including as Director 
of Terrorism Studies 2004-2010 in the Combating 
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Q & A with Eric Schmitt 
Interview by Lars Lilleby 
On the 6th of December 2011, Eric Schmitt, the co-author (with Thom Shanker) of 
Counterstrike, visited the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey to talk about his new book. 
Eric Schmitt is a senior writer who covers terrorism and national security  issues for The New 
York Times and has shared two Pulitzer Prizes. During his visit at the NPS, a n international 
student from the Norwegian Army, Major Lars Lilleby, conducted the following int erview: 
 
Lilleby:  In your new book you are talking about the new US strategy against terrorists – 
deterrence – a strategy well known from the Cold War. How does Al Qaeda react to this 
strategy and will this strategy work against other and smaller terrorist groups around 
the world? 
Schmitt:  I think this type of approach can work against any kind of network terrorist 
organization, in that you are both looking at nodes of the terrorist network to identify 
the vulnerabilities and susceptibilities that it has and then apply a strategy and approach 
that tries to go after that. In our book, the type of deterrence we talk about is Al Qaeda 
specific but it could be adapted to other organizations, too, in terms of identifying 
organizations that do not have physical things that they value. Classic deterrence is how 
you can hold physical things at risk. And, in Al Qaeda’s case, we talk about the virtual 
values, things like honor and prestige and the individual’s standing within the “Umma” 
or the Islamic public, and how you undermine those types of things and develop 
strategies to go up against that. As for Al Qaeda’s response, it’s hard to say, it’s not like 
people have gone and asked Al Qaeda leaders, “What do you think of the new 
deterrence structure?” I don’t think it’s quite that clear and I think they’re still very 
much involved, and even more involved in the kinetic fight on the ground. The 
ideological fight in terms of combating the narrative that we see; this is kind of a subtler 
approach that Al Qaeda perhaps hasn’t adjusted to yet. 
Lilleby:  What implication will this “new” strategy of deterrence have for the future of combating 
terror and would you recommend other countries follow this approach? Also, what role 
will U.S. allies and partners have in this new strategy against terrorism? 
Schmitt:  Well I think American allies are already playing a part in this strategy. I think they are 
adapting certain elements of this new deterrence strategy in their own fight against 
terrorism. This is something that can be applied against Al Qaeda wherever Al Qaeda is 
showing up, whether it’s in the affiliates in North Africa, East Africa, Somalia, Iraq; these 
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a resilient strategy, but flexible and supple and able to adapt as the enemy itself adapts. 
And if there are new elements that are considered new values that they hold, the 
United States, or its allies, have to be nimble enough and flexible enough to identify 
those new values and to target those as well, as part of any new and expanding 
deterrence strategy. 
Lilleby: In your chapter “Exploitation of Intelligence” you talk about a new approach in the use 
and sharing of intelligence. How well has this worked and does this help explain why the 
US eventually got hold of bin Laden in Abbottabad? 
Schmitt: I think, ultimately, the raid in Abbottabad in Pakistan culminated almost a decade’s 
worth of improved intelligence sharing, improved coordination between the intelligence 
committee, the Special Operations community, the military, and many other agencies of 
the United States government and other governments as well. I think what that raid 
showed was that the goal after 9/11 was breaking down some of the walls and sharing 
more intelligence, at first within the United States government, then expanding that, 
and being able to share outside the U.S. government. Now, there are still, to this day, 
restrictions on what the United States shares outside of the so called, “5 I” community 
of its closest allies. Even with other NATO allies it doesn’t share everything that it has. 
So, there are still certain restrictions that that could hamper counterterrorist activities, 
but I think the record, since 9/11, is much improved and the Abbottabad raid 
underscores this new kind of success. 
Lilleby:  In your book you talk about two operations, the Taji and Sinjar operations, both in Iraq. 
These operations were major intelligence breakthroughs in the war on terror. Why were 
those operations so significant and is this information still valuable today? What would 
you say are the key takeaways from these operations? 
Schmitt:  The Taji raid was important because it yielded what was basically the blueprint for Al 
Qaeda in Iraq’s counterattack against the American surge in 2007. It laid out where they 
were going to deploy their forces and essentially how they were going to attack the 
American and Iraqi forces. But it also gave some really interesting insights into what 
they were going to target to try and undermine the credibility of the new Iraqi 
government. They were going to target bakers, for instance, because baking fresh bread 
is part of everyday Iraqi life. They were going to try to target the garbage collectors in 
the hopes that garbage would pile up in the streets and people would become more and 
more angry and frustrated with their government’s lack of ability to carry out essential 
public services. Taji revealed everything from tactical positions on the battlefield to 
these more interesting ideas. Sinjar was important because it provided new insights into 
the pipeline for suicide bombers into Iraq.   
Lilleby: General McChrystal, the commander of these successful raids, has said we need to share 
all of this information. Is that still going on? Or is it something he brought forward, and 
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Schmitt: No, I think it’s still going on. Stanley McChrystal, who was then the head of the Joint 
Special Operations Command, did some revolutionary type thinking in terms of this. He 
really broke down many of the walls, certainly within his own organization so that 
people were sharing information in a real time way. Take the Sinjar raid. It is the best 
example of a raid by JSOC forces. It was on this little dusty camp, on the Syrian/Iraqi 
border, and what they ended up capturing is what we call the Al Qaeda rolodex. It is a 
very detailed account of the suicide bombers who were coming through from Syria into 
Iraq and countries all over North Africa and the Middle East. In the book, we talk about 
how Al Qaeda was as anal in its record keeping as the Nazis were. So you had the name, 
the hometown, and all sorts of details about each individual suicide bomber who was 
coming through this pipeline. McChrystal recognized the value of what his forces 
captured and recognized that it wouldn’t be enough just for him to hold onto this and 
parse it out, but that if he put it into the hands of the State Department it could be 
much more effective. He declassified most of that information, gave it to the State 
Department whose diplomats could then go country by country and present the 
information from the Sinjar files to these nations and say, “Look, this isn’t American 
propaganda, these are your own records. These are the photocopies and records from 
these individuals. And while you might not agree with American foreign policy, some of 
these people, if they’re not killed on the battlefield in Iraq, they could come back and be 
a threat to your country. So you need to take this seriously.” The upshot of it was that 
the suicide pipeline really was choked off by over 75%, as General David Petraeus 
 told us.  
Lilleby: Many critics of deterrence say that it only works against rational sovereign state actors. 
In your opinion, what are the challenges of using this strategy against non-state actors 
like Al Qaeda? 
Schmitt:  Clearly, there will always be elements of a terrorist network like Al Qaeda that are not 
deterrable. We’re not saying the strategy applies to everybody. Osama bin Laden, for 
instance, was probably undeterrable. There are certain suicide bombers that are 
probably undeterrable. But there are many others that we identify in our book that are 
enablers, the financiers or the gunrunners who are in it for economic reasons. There are 
others who maybe aren’t as committed jihadis as they thought. If you can undermine 
and question some of the values they have, that will cause them to either not go 
through with the attack or delay a bombing or force them to use a different route, a 
different method, a different type of explosive that maybe is less effective. So, I think it 
does have that kind of impact. 
Lilleby:  Are there any signs that Al Qaeda is responding to this new strategy?  
Schmitt:  In one sense, one way they’re responding is their deep concern for civilian casualties.  
For instance we’ve seen a lot of Al Qaeda leaders, including bin Laden, issue edicts, 
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that kill civilians, saying that these are very bad for public relations; it’s bad for our 
business because it’s not as if you’re killing security forces or Americans, you’re killing 
our own people, and that ultimately will make us very unpopular with them. There’s a 
recognition that this can be used against them in counter-messaging campaigns and so I 
think that’s one area where they have responded and tried to counter some of the more 
violent trends that cost civilian casualties.  
Lilleby:  The operation against bin Laden in Abbottabad was a huge success, both in terms of 
taking out UBL but also because of the amount of intelligence that was captured there. 
Has Al Qaeda recovered from that? And how will these events affect the organization 
and its strategy in the future?  
Schmitt:  In many ways, the core leadership of Al Qaeda in Pakistan was suffering even before 
the raid and are suffering more now because a few more of their leaders, most notably 
bin Laden, were killed, so it makes their ability to plan and execute attacks against the 
United States or Western interests much harder. Also they’ve spent so much of their 
time worrying about their own survival that they can’t spend much time on the attack.  
Lilleby: This implies we are dependent on making such significant captures of information and 
intelligence from time to time?  
Schmitt:  Absolutely. There will be new exploitation operations that go on that cause the enemy 
to go in different directions and evolve. There will be new targets for the U.S. and its 
allies to go after and hopefully capturing or intercepting communications and 
intercepting other types of intelligence caches that will give them the information to 
allow them to then carry out operations, whether they’re kinetic or psychological 
operations. As General McChrystal has said, it’s all about the fight for intelligence right 
now; that’s what this war on combating terrorism is really all about.  
Lilleby:  One chapter in your book is dedicated to Pakistan and the problems the Pakistanis face. 
Is the key to success in Afghanistan how the Pakistanis approach their domestic 
problem? What would be the best U.S. response to these problems? 
Schmitt:  The United States has spent many years trying to persuade, cajole, and threaten the 
Pakistanis to do more to wipe out these safe havens. Pakistan has either been unable or 
unwilling to do that completely. Pakistan has been a very valuable ally in going after Al 
Qaeda elements, particularly senior leaders of Al Qaeda right after 9/11 in some of its 
cities. It’s been much more reluctant, however, to go after some of these groups, such 
as the Taliban or the Haqqani network that they view as proxies for their interests in 
Afghanistan after the United States leaves in the next few years. Everything in Pakistan 
is viewed through the prism of India, and so right now the Pakistanis are very concerned 
that if the United States leaves it will leave a void in Afghanistan. India is already making 
inroads, both economic and political, and they will in effect encircle Pakistan; that’s 
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recognize that India does not pose an existential threat to the nation. That is very hard 
to get through right now, so the United States and Afghanistan is having to come up 
with a Plan B, and that is, if the Pakistanis aren’t able or willing to combat these militant 
elements, then the U.S. along with the Afghans will try and build a stronger, more 
effective ring of defenses along the border to try and contain the problem inside 
Pakistan. That hasn’t worked so far, as we’ve seen in some of the recent bombings in 
Kabul, which shows the Taliban’s ability to infiltrate and carry out attacks right in the 
heart of the city, right against the U.S. embassy and headquarters. So they’ve got a long 
way to go.     
Lilleby: What then would be the best U.S. response to these problems?  
Schmitt:  In the short term, the United States has basically said, “We have to take measures into 
our own hands,” so the drones have become a very important tool and tactic in 
combating Al Qaeda, not only in Pakistan, but places like Yemen and Somalia, now too. 
But the drones are just a tactic; they’re not a long term strategy.  I think the longer term 
strategy is to persuade and help these countries train their own forces—police, security 
forces, military forces—to combat these extremist threats so the U.S. and its allies don’t 
have to do that. Indigenous forces are usually better equipped in general to do this; they 
know the culture, they know the language. Their intelligence gathering ability is better 
from human sources and human intelligence, not necessarily technical intelligence. And 
so, if the U.S. can step back and rather than having to fight all these battles by putting 
troops in foreign countries, particularly Muslim countries, can instead help these 
countries fight the battle themselves more effectively, I think that’s the longer term 
plan. Short term, very tactical, more drone strikes; longer term, help build up the 
capacity of these indigenous forces. 
Lilleby:   Many officers in the U.S. and other countries criticize journalists and the media for being 
too fast and eager to publish “news” from groups like the Taliban in Afghanistan. From 
our perspective, too much of this “propaganda” is based on rumors and not facts. 
Journalists often claim that they evaluate all their sources carefully and adhere to a high 
standard of integrity regarding what’s true. What are your comments about this? 
Schmitt:  As journalists we’ll always have to be careful no matter where the information is coming 
from; if it’s slanted or pure propaganda. Certainly, we’ve gotten familiar with the type of 
statements the Taliban makes. If there’s a bombing, for instance, who’s responsible for 
the bombing, how large the casualties are, all these kind of things and so it may be that 
the only source of reporting or information, so this has to be very clearly laid out in our 
reporting: We have to be clear that this is only what the Taliban claims, that the 
government may have a totally different response. I think as long as journalists offer the 
appropriate caveats and warnings to readers, viewers, or listeners to say, “Hey, look this 
is what they’re saying but they don’t have a good track record. You don’t want to 





Vol. 2, No.1      CTX 
 
because there may be kernels of truth in these things, there may have well been an 
attack. There may well have been a drone that went down on the Iranian-Afghan 
border. Now, did the Iranians shoot it down? Did it crash for mechanical reasons or 
other reasons, we’ll get into that.” But the fact is something did crash. Some 
surveillance aircraft crashed. That’s important news to get out. But it’s also just as 
important to get to the facts surrounding what happened. That’s true with anything that 
happens in dealing with terrorist organizations. 
Lilleby:  In the epilogue of your book you say that “it will be impossible to end terrorism” and 
that terrorism will always be there.  You are probably aware of the idea that there have 
been waves of terrorism.  In your opinion, how long do you think this wave of religious 
terror will last and what will dominate the next wave? 
Schmitt:  It’s hard to predict how long these waves will last, but there are some positive trends 
that suggest that at least Al Qaeda may be on the way down. Now, whether some other 
religious form of terrorism takes its place or not and continues the wave in general is 
harder to say. But, optimistically speaking, there are American officials who believe that 
if they can kill or take out about half a dozen of the top leaders in the next few years 
that they will have been able to diminish the capability of Al Qaeda, and its franchises. 
What comes next, I think, is the realm of cyberspace. Terrorists, so far, have not used 
cyberspace in an offensive way; it’s been mostly a safe harbor for them where they can 
plan their attacks, where they can raise money and recruits. They actually haven’t used 
it in an offensive way against the United States or others; that has been more the realm 
of state-sponsored groups, the countries themselves. I would look to cyberspace as 
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The Moving Image  
By Kalev I. Sepp 
 
TOP TEN WAR MOVIES (about Irregular Warfare and Special Operations)  
 
 “Top Ten” list of motion pictures about 
Irregular Warfare and Special Operations has 
an objective similar to reading lists.  There are 
literally thousands of war movies, so it helps to narrow 
the field, and offer a few titles of particular note to 
military professionals and students.  Also, common 
viewing creates a basis of discussion, as with common 
reading of select books. 
This Top Ten list has its limitations.  All are 
English-language films, excepting the Italian-
made/French-and-Arabic-language La Bataille 
d’Alger/The Battle of Algiers. This excludes some 
noteworthy Irregular Warfare movies, like the Peruvian 
La Boca Del Lobo, the French La 317e Section, and the 
Russian 9th Company.  Also, none are 
documentaries.  They may be historical 
fiction, or carry the disclaimer, “based 
on actual events.”  In every case, a real 
understanding of the action and 
context of the films can only be gained 
by reading serious books on the 
subject. 
Still, there are benefits to 
movie-watching.  Unlike reading a 
book, viewing a film can be done 
collectively; there is the opportunity for a  
shared experience and common understanding.  
Cinematography is an art form, and can entertain as well 
as evoke contemplation of the subjects addressed.  The 
intention of this Top Ten list is to suggest movies that 
convey a sense of the nature of irregular warfare, and the 
character of Special Operations.  For both the 
professional and the “non-specialist,” this feeling might 
improve their understanding of these kinds of warfare.  A 
picture, after all, is worth a thousand words -- which 
makes each movie, comprised of thousands of images, a 
visual novel. 
Here are this writer’s Top Ten movies, in historical 
order of the wars in which they are set: 
LAST OF THE MOHICANS (1992) 
In the mid-18th century, a few European 
regiments and their native allies battle 
in the primeval wilderness for control 
of half the North American continent.  
Hawkeye (Daniel Day Lewis), a 
frontiersman and adopted white 
Mohican, is the consummate irregular 
warrior.  Armed with his tomahawk, 
knife, and longue carabine (long rifle), 
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the forests of the Hudson Valley with 
the Hurons and French to save his 
friends, his tribe, and the woman he 
loves.  Awarded an Oscar. 
FORT APACHE (1948) 
In post-Civil War Arizona territory, a 
by-the-book commander of a U.S. 
cavalry outpost applies conventional 
tactics and attitude against an 
unconventional opponent – the 
Chiricahua Apaches, masters of 
guerrilla warfare.  The story of the 
arrogant colonel from “back East” (Henry Fonda) who 
ignores his frontier-savvy officers and sergeants 
(including John Wayne) is loosely based on Lt. Col. George 
Custer and the Battle of the Little Big Horn. 
ZULU (1964) 
The year is 1879.  A 20,000-man Zulu army armed only 
with spears massacres 1,300 rifle-bearing British and 
allied soldiers in a single day at Isandhalwana.  4,000 Zulu 
warriors then detach to mop up an 
understrength company of red-coated 
British infantry at Rourke’s Drift.  The 
result surprises both sides.  Eleven of 
the surviving Tommies receive the 
Victoria Cross – the most ever for a 
single unit in a single action.  
Sometimes, irregular warfare can just 
be a helluva gunfight.  (Hint:  Fast-
forward through the irrelevant scenes 
of the drunken minister and  
 
his daughter; they’re completely 
fictional.) 
BREAKER MORANT (1980) 
An Australian counter-guerrilla unit 
leader applies “Rule 303” against Boer 
irregulars and spies on the South 
African veldt in 1902 – as per orders 
from headquarters.  But Lieut. Harry 
Morant is court-martialed for his 
tough tactics by his waxed-moustache 
British superiors, to appease Boer 
leaders so they’ll begin peace talks.  
The sharply anti-British tone of this Australian film is 
quite intentional.  (Turn on the English subtitles -- the 
accents of the Aussies, Scots and Brits in the echo-
chamber courtroom scenes make the dialogue almost 
unintelligible.)  Nominated for an Oscar. 
LAWRENCE OF ARABIA (1962) 
An Arabic-speaking Oxford archeologist joins the British 
Army, and is sent to blow up the Turkish railroads he 
travelled on when he did field 
research across the Ottoman Middle 
East before the Great War of 1914-18.   
To accomplish this, he leads Arab 
irregulars in a revolt against their 
Ottoman masters.  The remarkable 
story of T.E. Lawrence follows this 
university scholar’s rise from observer 
to adviser to guerrilla army 
commander, and is enhanced by the 
spectacular locations in this 
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Incidentally, Peter O’Toole was only the fifth choice 
 for the lead role.  Awarded seven Oscars, including 
 Best Picture. 
THE BRIDGE ON THE RIVER KWAI (1957) 
The mission:  Form a four-man team, jump into Japanese-
occupied Thailand, link up with the “indig,” march cross-
country, and blow up a railroad bridge.  The team leader 
is an SOE officer, and fluent in the native dialect.  One 
team member escaped from the Japanese POW camp at 
the bridge site.  What could go 
wrong?  Well, almost everything.  
Perhaps a British colonel (Alec 
Guinness) collaborating with the 
Japanese might also prove 
troublesome.  Note:  When the 
movie was released, former Allied 
prisoners-of-war picketed at 
theaters in England and Australia, 
protesting that the movie did not 
adequately portray Japanese 
cruelty and atrocities during 
World War II.  Awarded seven 
Oscars, including Best Picture. 
A BELL FOR ADANO (1945) 
Call it “Stability Operations,” “Civil Affairs,” “Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction,” or “Transitional Military Authority,” the 
trials of rebuilding communities devastated by war are 
constant.  Major Victor Joppolo is the U.S. military 
governor of the cratered Sicilian town of Adano in 1943.  
His newly-liberated townspeople need the coast road to 
cart in food and water, but the U.S. division commander 
orders the major to keep the road clear at all times for 
military convoys.  What’s more, the Fascisti took the great 
town bell, a source of civic pride; the citizens want him to 
replace it -- immediately.  And what is this ‘democracy’ the 
major keeps talking about?  The movie is based on the 
Pulitzer Prize-winning novel of the same name. 
THE BEST YEARS OF OUR LIVES (1946) 
Here’s a hard look at how Americans back home in the 
States don’t understand or appreciate the experiences 
and sacrifices of servicemen returning from distant wars 
overseas – and their struggles with 
unemployment, estrangement, 
substance abuse, nightmares, 
divorce, and loss of limbs.  In 
1946.  This film is especially for 
those who imagine the post-World 
War II years were some sort of 
“golden age” for returning U.S. 
combat veterans.  Awarded eight 
Oscars, including Best Picture. 
LA BATAILLE D’ALGER / THE 
BATTLE OF ALGIERS (1966) 
Commissioned by the then-newly 
independent revolutionary 
government of Algeria, this film 
employs a documentary style to tell the victorious 
rebels’ version of their urban insurgency against the 
French paratroopers and pieds noirs.  Some of it is true, 
some is what the rebels wished was true, and some is 
pure fabrication – and very well done, in any regard.  It 
is a striking view of urban guerrilla warfare, and 










What happens when 
the major general 
commanding Task 
Force Ranger in the 
cinderblock maze of 
Mogadishu in 1993 
ignores the venerable 
“Rogers’ Rangers 
Standing Orders” of 1757? – notably, “Don't ever march 
home the same way; take a different route so you won't 
be ambushed.”  This film shows the awful price paid by 
soldiers when their leaders underestimate irregular 
opponents – a recurrent fault in U.S. military expeditions.  
Awarded two Oscars. 
WORST 
Then there are the “Worst War Movies (about Irregular 
Warfare and Special Operations).”  Leading this very large 
pack, in no particular order: 
RAMBO II & III (1985 & 1988) 
As embarrassing to U.S. Army Green 
Berets as Navy SEALs is to Navy SEALs.  
Rambo III received five Razzie 
nominations, including Worst Film, 
Worst Director, Worst Screenplay, 
Worst Supporting Actor, and Worst 
Actor (Sylvester Stallone). 
NEVER SO FEW (1959) 
The only movie made about the OSS in 
World War II, Never So Few is The A-
Team without the gripping realism.  The lackadaisical 
performances by the actors (including Frank Sinatra and 
Steve McQueen) give the impression the movie was 
made in a careless rush, and every scene was shot in one 
“eh, good enough” take.  Hollywood was full of OSS 
alumni after the war; it’s a shame this was the best they 
could do to tell their story. 
THE WILD GEESE (1978) 
A shady financier hires over-the-hill white mercenaries 
(led by Richard Burton) to rescue an African leader 
ousted in a coup.  The mercs – swell guys all – do one P.T. 
workout, parachute via free-fall into an unnamed 
country, slaughter hundreds of blacks with bullets, poison 
arrows, and cyanide gas, then run for the border with 
their prize – supporting the apartheid view that only 
whites can save blacks from themselves.  Racist and 
despicable. 
HURT LOCKER (2008) 
  Deplored by all Iraq and Afghanistan EOD veterans for 
its jarring inaccuracies, particularly the erratic, lone-wolf 
personality of the team leader – the antithesis of a 
successful bomb disposal specialist.  
Awarded six Oscars, including Best 
Picture and Best Director. 
BEHIND ENEMY LINES (2001) 
Like Hurt Locker, deplored by all Air 
Force officers for the escape-and-evade 
ineptness of the pilot (comedic actor 
Owen Wilson) shot down over Bosnia 
during the NATO “peacekeeping” 
mission in 1995, and the political flip-
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commanders (including Gene Hackman) 
directing the combat-search-and-rescue 
operation. 
THE GREEN BERETS (1968) 
This film – very possibly the worst war 
movie ever made – inspired a drove of 
Special Forces colonels to believe they 
could imitate Colonel Mike Kirby (John 
Wayne), and personally lead each of 
their group’s fifty-plus A-Detachments in 
combat.  Who needs all those company 
and battalion commanders, anyway? 
FUNNIEST 
There’s a parallel category to the Irregular 
Warfare/Special Ops “Worst” movies – which is 
“Funniest.”  Most were not intended to be laughable, but 
they just turned out that way.  Several of note include: 
NAVY SEALS (1990) 
It’s not a war movie; it’s a “bro-mance.”  And ooh, such 
coiffures. 
DELTA FORCE (1986) 
Chuck Norris is so serious it’s comical; not to mention Lee 
Marvin as the Oldest Colonel in the World. 
CHARLIE WILSON’S WAR (2007) 
Even the major critics called it a “comedy-drama” and 
“political satire.” 
 
OPERATION DUMBO DROP (1995) 
Is an elephant for the village of Dak Nhe 
like a bell for the town of Adano?  Just 
add Green Berets and a cargo 
parachute. 
G.I. JANE (1997) 
Demi Moore, chosen for her femininity 
(really, they say so in the movie!), guts 
out a SEAL-ish selection course, then 
rescues Rangers surrounded in the 
Libyan desert.  Would Jody Foster, the 
original choice for the lead, have made this believable? 
One more reason for lists of this brand of war 
movies, is to incite readers to challenge the titles 
presented, and suggest others (“Where is Red Dawn?!”  
“What about that great 1948 Franco-Norwegian film 
about the Vemork Heavy Water Raid, Kampen om 
tungtvannet?”).  Such recommendations are gladly 
welcomed. 
 




Dr. Kalev I. Sepp is senior lecturer in Defense Analysis at 
the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.  He earned his 
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It’s not just borrowing a pen  
from work and forgetting to return it. 
This is a serious offense.… 
Now, imagine that  
weeks or maybe months go by,  
and nothing happens. Nothing. 
Ethics & Insights  
by George Lober  
et me offer the outline of a very general but 
common case study. A subordinate witnesses a 
peer, or a superior, doing something that is 
patently wrong. The wrong being committed is a 
prosecutable act. Maybe it’s the embezzlement of funds, 
or maybe it’s an ongoing pattern of fraud from which the 
perpetrator has profited. Maybe it’s the theft of 
expensive organizational 
resources and property, or 
maybe it’s the molestation of 
another, weaker employee 
within the organization. The 
point is, the wrong discovered is 
no minor infraction or bending 
of a rule. It’s not just borrowing 
a pen from work and forgetting 
to return it. This is a  
serious offense. 
Now imagine that same subordinate, following 
policy and the chain of command, reports the wrongful 
act either to his or her immediate superiors, or—in the 
case of an immediate superior being the actual 
perpetrator—to those appropriately next in the line of 
authority. The ranking individuals who receive the 
information thank the subordinate for coming forward 
and then promise to handle the situation. 
Now imagine that weeks or maybe months go by, 
and nothing happens. Nothing. Or imagine that instead of 
nothing happening, the perpetrator suddenly retires with 
an appropriate organizational celebration and full 
retirement benefits. Or maybe the perpetrator is 
promoted to another position in another area, and the 
promotion includes an increase in salary. In any event, 
the perpetrator is not dismissed, not charged, not 
prosecuted, not called to account for the wrong 
committed. 
At this point, imagine 
that you are the subordinate 
described above. What is your 
role, if any? Do you have an 
ethical obligation to take what 
you have discovered further? 
What if you have strong reason 
to believe that those high up in 
the organization are aware of 
your report but have chosen to deal with the situation as 
indicated above? Do you consider going outside the 
organization? What if revealing that information could 
potentially damage the reputation of the organization 
itself? What if going outside the organization also 
involves serious risks to your position, your ability to 
support yourself and your family, even your career if your 
lack of discretion and loyalty are discovered? What if such 
a discovery could imperil your safety? Are you still 
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You’re suddenly characterized as 
lacking moral courage.  
Is that fair? Is it accurate? 
Yet, what if you don’t 
act and don’t take the 
information you’ve discovered 
further? Are you, in essence, 
entering into a degree of 
complicity with the wrong committed? You know it 
happened. You know it was wrong. To the very best of 
your knowledge, no punitive action was taken. If you 
remain silent, are you to some degree sanctioning an 
apparent cover-up? 
Flash ahead six months—or maybe a couple of 
years—to a point in time when the wrong committed is 
eventually discovered by someone else, and suddenly you 
are called to task for not pursuing the matter further and 
not doing more, even if it meant going outside the 
organizational chain of command. You’re suddenly 
characterized as lacking moral courage. Is that fair?  
Is it accurate? 
 
For the next couple of issues, 
the subject of moral courage 
will be the focus of this column. 
Your thoughts and comments 
regarding the above case study 
and the topic of moral courage are invited. 
 
George Lober guides U.S. and international military 
students through the tricky terrain of ethics and critical 








Thoughts or comments regarding moral courage?  
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Call For Submissions 
The Combating Terrorism Exchange journal (CTX) accepts submissions of nearly any type. Our aim is to distribute 
high quality international analyses, opinions, and reports to military officers, government officials, and security and 
academic professionals in the world of counterterrorism.  We give priority to non-typical, insightful submissions, and to 
topics concerning countries with the most pressing terrorism and CT issues. We accept submissions from anyone. 
 
SUBMISSION GUIDELINES 
CTX accepts the following types of submissions, and offers the following length guidelines: 
 academic analyses (5,000-7,000 words) 
 reports or insightful stories from the field (2,000 words) 
 photographic essays 
 video clips with explanation or narration 
 interviews with relevant figures (no longer than 15 minutes) 
 book reviews (500-1,000 words); review essays (1,000-3,000 words); or lists of books of interest (which may 
include books in other languages) 
 reports on any special projects 
 
SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS  
Submissions to CTX must adhere to the following: 
 they must be copyedited for basic errors prior to submission; 
 citations should adhere to the Chicago style manual; 
 the work submitted may not be plagiarized in part or in whole;  
 you must have received consent from anyone whose pictures, videos, or statements you include in your work;   
 you must agree to our Copyright Disclaimer; 
 include a byline as you would like it to appear and a short bio as you would like it to appear (we may use either, 
or both); 
 
Any kind of submission can be multimedia.   
 
Submissions should be sent in original, workable format (in other words, we must be able to edit your work in the 
format in which you send it to us: no .PDF's please!) 
Submissions should be in English.  Because we seek  submissions from the global CT community, and especially look 
forward to work which will stir debate,  WE WILL NOT REJECT submissions outright simply because of poorly written 
English.  However, we may ask you to have your submission re-edited before submitting again. 
READY TO SUBMIT?                                                      
By making a submission to CTX you are acknowledging that your submission adheres to all of the "SUBMISSION 
REQUIREMENTS" listed above, and that you agree to the CTX Terms of Copyright, so read them carefully.   
Once you have met the above requirements and agree to the Terms of Copyright, you may send your submission 
directly to: CTXSubmit@gmail.com 
 









Fighting Back:  
What Governments  
Can Do About Terrorism 
                                                         
Stanford Security Studies                                                         
An imprint of Stanford University Press 
ISBN-10: 0-8047-7708-X                                                                                                          
ISBN-13: 978-0-8047-7708-7 
 
Paul Shemella retired from the Navy at the rank 
of Captain after a career in Special Operations.  He is 
currently the Program Manager for the Combating 
Terrorism Fellowship Program at The Center for Civil-
Military Relations, an arm of The Naval Postgraduate 
School in Monterey, CA. 
“To defeat the modern terrorist’s methods of aggression 
we must depart from conventional thinking of past wars 
and move to a more unconventional, irregular model that 
requires us to act at the speed of our adversaries.  This 
book addresses those challenges, discussing past attacks, 
and provides a framework from which governments can 
act.”        - Albert M. Calland III, VADM, USN (Ret) 
“No government effort is more ‘interagency’ than preventing 
terrorism or dealing with it when it cannot be prevented.  
Fighting Back is a surprisingly readable guide for developing 
‘whole-of-government’ and multinational strategies against 
terrorism – for our international partners as well as our  
own leaders.”           
- The Honorable James R. Locher III, former Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low 
Intensity Conflict 
 
“Terrorism is a devilish problem.  Paul Shemella and his 
fellow authors – an impressive mix of thoughtful 
observers and seasoned practitioners – put a range of the 
pieces together in a way that advances understanding 
and, especially, provides a comprehensive guide for 
students.”      
 - Gregory Treverton, Director, RAND Center for 
Global Risk and Security         
“Based on the experiences of 130 countries that are 
fighting terrorism within the context of their own laws, 
capabilities, and security frameworks, Fighting Back 
provides the first strategic framework for addressing this 
complex issue in a workable way.” 
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Some of the masters profiled, clockwise from top right: Josip Broz“Tito”, Denis Davydov, Nathan Bedford 
Forrest, Orde Wingate (in pith helmet), Phoolan Devi, Giuseppe Garibaldi, and Nathanael Greene 
 
John Arquilla chronicles the deadly careers of the greatest masters of irregular warfare over 
the past 250 years. From wilderness rangers to sea raiders, early guerrillas to modern 
insurgents, the cast of characters comes from many nations around the world. 
 
“Arquilla's perspective enables 
readers to understand and respect the 
historical context of the qualities 
required to wage irregular war and 
the skills required to master it.” 
- Dennis Showalter, Military 
historian, Colorado College 
“Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits is a 
great overview of irregular warfare 
for the student, academic, and lay 
reader. Arquilla adds to his academic 
muscle with an enjoyable work that 
reads less like history and more like 
an adventure story.” 
- New York Journal Of Books 
“John Arquilla brings to life the 
accomplishments of „great captains‟ 
in irregular warfare, using 
comparative history, biography, 
shrewd policy analysis and an 
uncommon appreciation for military 
strategy.” 
 - Stephen J. Cimbala, Penn State
